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ABSTRACT 
In the years 1964 to 1992, 46 aircraft pushback accidents 
which resulted in death or injury to pushback crew 
members were reported worldwide. 21 of these accidents have 
occurred in the last 4 years of the study period. In most 
cases the crew members were run over by the aircraft or the 
pushback tug. In a small number of cases the tug Drivers 
were crushed in collisions between the aircraft and the tug. 
Evidence indicates that the crew members were required to 
remain in or near the hazard zones associated with the 
aircraft or tug during all or part of the pushback 
operation. Those aircraft Despatchers injured were in 
communication with the aircrew in the aircraft cockpit and 
were connected to the aircraft via a headset and hardware 
cable when the accidents occurred. This paper analyses some 
common causal factors of these pushback accidents and 
suggests a number of possible engineering solutions which 
may be implemented by airlines to minimise the risk of 
recurrence. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Pushback Operation 
Pushback is commonly considered to be that part of aircraft 
operation when the aircraft is pushed rearwards away from 
the passenger terminal at the commencement of a flight. 
However, it usually includes three stages: the attachment 
of a pushback tug to the aircraft, normally to the aircraft 
FIGURE 1 
B747 Pushback at Rome: 3 Person Operation 
Pespatcher, Driver and Observer 
nosewheel by means of a towbar, the rearward push of the 
aircraft, often including a turn; and the disconnection of 
the tug and towbar from the aircraft. Sometimes, there is a 
fourth stage added where, after the rearward push and turn, 
the aircraft is towed forward a short distance to permit 
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safe aircraft engine start. The pushback operation 
concludes when the pilot is given an "all clear" signal by 
the ground staff member or "Despatcher". Figures Nos. 1 to 
4 depict typical pushback operations. 
FIGURE 2 
Niaht B747 Pushback at Rome: 3 Person Operation 
Despatcher. Driver and Winqwalker 
(Note Wirtgwalfcer wearing orange weatherproofs, other side of aircraft past nosewheel) 
Risk of Injury 
During pushback the risk exists for staff who are required 
to walk beside the aircraft or tug to be injured. The mass 
of the aircraft and pushback tug, and the energy contained 
in the aircraft and tug system, exceeds by far the tolerance 
of the human body to resist injury. 
Therefore, to ensure injuries do not occur, one of the four 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
Causes and Prevention 
countermeasures of Viner (1982) must apply; either remove 
the energy, control it, prevent its transfer to the person, 
or raise the person's injury threshold. 
FIGURE 3 
B747 Pushback at London: 3 Person Operation 
Despatcher, Driver and Observer 
(Mote Observer walking forward of path of nosewheels) 
As the energy is intrinsic to the pushback operation, it is 
not possible to remove it. Also, it is impractical to 
provide a physical barrier around the potentially damaging 
energy space of the aircraft nosewheel and pushback tug, and 
it is not possible to improve the injury threshold of the 
person as no practical personal protective equipment exists. 
Therefore, to control the energy and prevent injury to the 
ground staff, many airlines have relied on the staff to 
closely adhere to procedures intended to keep them out of 
the energy space. 
- 3 -
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FIGURE 4 
Disconnecting the Towbar 
B747 Pushback at Bangkok: 4 Person Operation 
Despatcher. Driver and 2 Observers (Note the Observ r in path of the nosewhe ls and istracted by som  extraneous factor) 
In most airlines such procedures are well documented and 
provide explicit instructions as to the organisation's 
expectations of ground staff behaviour during the pushback 
process. It is not uncommon for airlines to utilise up to 4 
persons in their pushback operations, 1 Despatcher, 1 Driver 
and 1 or 2 Observers or Wingwalkers. For example, Appendix 
No.l details the pushback procedures of Australian Airlines 
which usually used 3 staff for all pushbacks. 
However, reliance on procedural compliance to prevent 
injuries is ranked low in the "Hierarchy of Controls" order 
(Department of Labour, 1990). Procedural barriers are only 
- 4 -
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effective when procedural compliance is unilaterally 
achieved,, and reliance on human behaviour alone to ensure 
accident prevention, leaves it exposed to such human 
frailties as distraction, concentration lapse, tiredness, 
poor understanding and frustration. 
Appendix No.2 provides summaries of the 46 pushback 
accidents recorded 1964-1992. 
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2. THE NEED FOR RESEARCH 
Preliminary analysis of information concerning the 33 
pushback accidents in Hogwood (1992) (see Appendix No. 3) 
indicated that the instance of aircraft pushback accidents 
was increasing. Figure 5 depicts the Hogwood data and shows 
that 19 accidents had occurred in the 21 years 1968 to 1988 
at a mean rate of 0.90 per annum. However, 14 accidents had 
occurred in the 3 years 1990 to 1991 at a rate of 4.67 per 
annum. This apparent occurrence rate increase was the 
reason the pushback accident issue was brought to attention. 
The following Aim and Objectives were developed to identify 
the.fundamental causes of these accidents and determine 
preventive measures which, when applied to pushback 
operations, would curb the rate of accident occurrence. 
2.1 Aim 
To analyse aircraft pushback accidents which have resulted 
in death or serious injury to aircraft pushback ground crew 
members and develop effective strategies to prevent such 
accidents. 
2.2 Obi ectives 
2.2.1 To determine causes of known pushback accidents 
1964-1992. 
- 6 -
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2.2.2 To consult with at least 24 Airline Safety 
Professionals, 12 aircraft Despatchers, 10 Pushback 
Drivers and 4 Aircrew to determine their: 
a) Airlines' pushback systems in use. 
b) Views on the safety of pushback operations. 
c) Opinions on the causes of pushback accidents 
their airlines have experienced, if any. 
d) Views on possible pushback accident preventive 
measures. 
2.2.3 To develop strategies to prevent pushback accidents. 
Annual Distribution of Pushback Accidents 1968 -1991 
(from Hogwood (1992)) 
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3. REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF THE LITERATURE 
3.1 Scientific and Trade Journals: Pushback Accidents and Injuries 
Extensive search of scientific and trade journals revealed 
only four papers which addressed the issue of pushback 
injuries and injury prevention. 
Barnett (1990) reported 22 occasions of an aircraft ground 
crew member being run over during pushback or towing 
operations. The paper suggested that "A basic tenet is that 
ground personnel be constantly aware of their position 
relative to that of the airplane and that when airplane 
movement is imminent or in progress, the personnel position 
themselves accordingly". Barnett suggested that two of the 
accidents resulted from the Despatcher's headset cord 
becoming entangled in the nose landing gear of the aircraft. 
To prevent such accidents, Barnett stated that Despatchers 
should "ensure that the interphone cord does not drag in the 
path of wheels" and "maintain adequate separation between 
themselves and hazardous airplane components". 
: Barnett offered as another solution an alternative cordless 
communication system. However, he went on to state "while 
this cordless system provides an option for the operator, it 
does not reduce the awareness factor which must be 
exercised by ground personnel. There is always a danger of 
being run over by a moving airplane or being sucked into a 
running engine. Complacency on the flightline is a sure way 
. to invite an accident". 
- 8 -
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Anderson (1991) concurred with Barnett that "staying alert 
and clear of the path of the airplane's wheels is essential 
to preventing injuries". Anderson argued that aircraft 
configuration played a major role in pushback accident 
causation "There have been no injury accidents involving 
airplanes with relatively low ground clearahce (less than 5 
feet). The fuselage prevents people from walking close to 
the nose wheels. Run over accidents involved the A300, B747, 
B757, B767, DC-8, DC-10 and L1011: these airplanes have more 
than five feet of ground clearance". 
Anderson also suggested that the position of the 
communication cord connection on the aircraft was also a 
factor "For most airplanes this phone connection is close 
to the nose wheels. A headset cord of insufficient lengthy 
forces the user to walk close to the nose wheels increasing 
the risk of injury. A long headset cord, if allowed to drag 
near the nose gear, may become entangled, pulling the 
operator into the rotating wheels however, when let out 
and kept taut by the operator, can be used as a distance 
indicator to maintain separation from the nose gear". 
Anderson cited two approaches tb preventing accidents 
"(1) train personnel how to work in the hazard area, or (2) 
change the pushback procedure to prohibit personnel in the 
hazard area". However, earlier in the paper he had reported 
that "Carelessness and inattention have contributed to 78% 
of the accidents" and this may significantly reduce the 
effectiveness of the training solution. Prohibiting 
- 9 -
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personnel in the ha2ard area is concluded by Anderson as 
"the key to reducing these accidents. One method for 
accomplishing this is to have the tug Driver conduct 
communications with the airplane flight crew". 
Van Paasschen (1991) argued the focus of attention needed to 
be on "Human factors. Millions of laws and rules have been 
written as to how people should work. However, the real 
bottom line in accident prevention still depends on the 
individual exposed to the hazard. Many of the causes of ramp 
incidents are 'human factors' which cannot be dealt with 
simply through procedures and standards. This has created a 
need for improved training to implement 'human factor' 
principles in the ramp environment". Training was the only 
accident prevention strategy cited. 
Jackson (1993) continued the thrust toward the individual 
"Staying alert and clear of the path of the airplane's 
wheels is essential to prevent injuries", and "Carelessness 
and inattention,have contributed to most of the accidents. 
In thirteen accidents the rolling wheels directly pinned 
personnel suggesting a lack of attention to the changing 
airplane position". 
Jackson restated the issues covered by Anderson (1991) on 
the limitations of training as a solution, the definition of 
a hazard zone around the nosewheel, possible use of cordless 
headsets and removing ground personnel from the hazard area. 
Jackson also concluded that "There needs to be an increase 
in awareness about carelessness and inattention", and 
- 10 -
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thereby returned the prevention thrust toward the 
individual. * 
3.2 Online Searches 
Due to the small number of papers on aircraft pushbacks or 
pushback accidents which had been identified through basic 
research methods, it was decided to gain the assistance of 
the Ballarat University College Barker Library and an 
on-line computer search was conducted. Seven databases 
considered most likely to contain information on aircraft 
pushbacks or pushback accidents were searched using 17 
aircraft pushback related key words. A list of the 
databases searched and key words used is at Appendix No. 4. 
No references to aircraft pushbacks or pushback accidents 
were found by the online search. 
3.3 Other Relevant Documented Information 
3.3.1 Accident Occurrence Summaries 
Four summaries of pushback accidents were obtained. 
As mentioned in Section 2 above, Hogwood (1992) 
reported the occurrence of 33 accidents worldwide 1968 
- 1991. However, information provided on each 
accident was limited to: year of occurrence, airline, 
location, aircraft type and resultant degree of 
- 11 -
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injury. Hogwood (1993) was an update-of the Hogwood 
(1992) list of accidents providing the same type of 
information. 
Dial . (1993) reported details of 39 accidents and 
provided information on date, aircraft type, airline, 
location and a brief summary of the event. 
Vogt et al (1.993) reported findings of an 
investigation into a pushback accident at Hayden, 
Colorado on March 27, 199,2. The Despatcher was run 
over by the aircraft nosewheel as the aircraft nose 
swung toward the Despatcher during a turn in the 
pushback. In their findings, Vogt et al suggested 
"Pushback procedures that require ground personnel to 
be close to the nose gear and directly connected to 
the communications panel in the nose gear well are 
unnecessary and unsafe. Procedures should be designed 
to provide the maximum protection to ground service 
personnel during potentially hazardous pushback 
operations. Procedures must provide for ground 
service personnel to be clear of the nosegear". 
3.3.2 Aircraft Pushback Procedures Worldwide 
Hayes (1993) reported findings of a survey of 32 
airlines and 2 aircraft ground handling companies 
worldwide. Twenty airlines reported solely using 
pushback procedures that required the Despatcher to 
walk beside the aircraft during pushback while 
- 12 -
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communicating with the Aircrew via the hardwire 
headset connected directly to the aircraft. Eleven 
organisations reported having adopted procedures which 
removed the requirement for any person to walk beside 
the aircraft nose or pushback tug. These 
organisations had transfered cockpit to ground 
communications during pushback to the person or 
persons inside the tug. 
Only 3 airlines reported using cordless communications 
between the aircrew and the Despatcher, although none 
used this method exclusively. 
Nine of the airlines which presently require a person 
to walk beside the aircraft reported that they were 
evaluating changing procedures to either cordless 
communications or placing the Despatcher inside the 
tug. 
In November 1993, the International Air Transport 
Section (ARTEX) of the National Safety Council of 
America published pushback safety recommendations 
which suggested the Despatcher should not be required 
to walk beside the aircraft or tug during pushback. 
ARTEX argued that to curb the increasing number of 
fatalities, the communication between the ground crew 
and aircrew should be carried out from within the 
pushback tug, either by the tug Driver, or by 
positioning the Despatcher inside the tug with the 
Driver. Also, cordless communication headsets were 
- 13 -
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suggested as one method of either transfering 
communications into the tug, or if it was necessary 
for the Despatcher to walk, the person would have 
freedom of movement to remain well outside the hazard 
zone associated with the nose wheel and pushback tug. 
3.3.3 Cordless Communications 
Giacopelli (1991) described the application of radio 
technology for cockpit to Despatcher communications. 
Although the paper was directed at the technical 
aspects of the radios and not the effect on Despatcher 
safety, Giacopelli suggested that in part, the 
advantages of a cordless system were that it provided 
the Despatcher with mobility, allowed more than one 
ground staff member into the communications loop and 
all ground staff as well as the aircrew could monitor 
pushback communications. 
The Boeing evaluation of an Earmark cordless 
communications system in 1989 concluded that the unit 
was capable of "usable" communications in all 
situations. Clarity of communications was not 
affected until batteries began to weaken after 3.5 
days of almost continuous operational use. There was 
no radio interference with any other transmitting or 
receiving equipment in use on the airport at the time 
of the tests. 
One problem mentioned by Boeing was that of frequency 
- 14 -
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allocation. Countries differ greatly in their use of 
the radio frequency spectrum and frequencies available 
for aircraft ground communications in one country may 
be unavailable in another. 
Toyocom (1991) reported that use of their cordless 
interphone system removed the following Despatcher 
safety problems associated with use of the traditional 
hard wire headset: "Electric shock through the , 
interphone in the event of fuselage charging due to 
lightning" and"Accident resulting in injury, death or 
damage to the fuselage caused by insufficient 
communication". 
However, the 1992 Qantas Airways evaluation of the 
Toyocom system, produced mixed results. Despatchers 
who participated in the trials varied greatly in their 
opinions. Despatcher responses ranged from "operation 
and principal very good, system allows safe and 
flexible communications with the cockpit" to "Poor 
clarity, with most transmissions requiring to be 
repeated". 
3.3.4 Towbarless Pushback Tractors 
All of the papers obtained on the subject of 
towbarless pushback tractors, for example Magnay 
(1990a), Magnay (1990b), Walker (1990), Doyle (1992) 
and Wine (1993), discussed only the operational 
aspects of towbarless tractor use. None addressed any 
•—— " " I mliir^ 
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possible benefits to the safety of operations or to 
the safety of ground staff involved in towbarless 
tractor use. 
3.4 Conclusions Concerning the Literature 
There was very little discussion in the literature on the 
application of engineering solutions to the pushback 
accident problem. All four journal articles on pushback 
accidents focused attention on modifying the behaviour of 
the individual as a central prevention strategy. Hazard 
awareness and training were seen as the key solutions to 
preventing accidents which were considered to be largely due 
to the carelessness and inattention of the individuals 
involved. 
However, Anderson (1991) and Jackson (1993) did take the 
accident prevention issue further and suggested the need for 
changes to operational procedures to remove the Despatcher 
from the hazard zone associated with the tug and aircraft 
nose wheel. 
Also, it was significant that none of the papers which 
listed pushback accidents provided any substantiated 
information on causation. Only Dial (1993) included brief 
cirmumstances of each accident. 
Application of cordless communications system was suggested 
as an option by some authors (eg Barnett 1990, Anderson 1991 
and Jackson 1993), although there was significant variation 
- 16 -
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in the literature concerning their suitability. Giacopelli 
(1991) indicated there were advantages, however the Qantas 
(1992) report of operational tests suggested there may be 
unresolved problems associated with their use. It is 
significant that only 3 of the 34 organisations surveyed in 
Hayes (1993) were using cordless communications and none 
were using them solely. 
A particular shortcoming of the Literature was that there 
were no papers found which discussed the safety 
ramifications of use of towbarless pushback tugs. 
One area of major concern regarding all the literature, 
was the almost complete lack of use or quotation of 
references by authors. This made the literature search 
process more difficult and meant that information contained 
in the literature had to be largely taken at face value. 
- 17 -
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A. DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Hypothesis 
Aircraft pushback accidents have resulted from the failure 
of inadequate control mechanisms and the resultant exposure 
of pushback ground crew members to the potentially damaging 
energy of the aircraft nosewheels, mainwheels and/or 
pushback tug. 
4.2 Design '- . 
4.2.1 It was planned to seek copies of pushback accident 
reports from the airlines involved in the various 
accidents. 
4.2.2 Safety Professionals of a cross-section of airlines 
were to be interviewed to discuss the pushback 
accident issue. Information on their existing 
aircraft pushback systems, equipment, training and 
accident prevention methods was to be sought. 
4.2.3 Samples of Despatchers, Drivers and Aircrew were to be 
interviewed to ascertain their understanding of the 
hazards and the existing preventive measures. 
4.2.4 Aircraft and support equipment manufacturers were to 
be contacted by letter, or by telephone where 
appropriate, to seek performance details of state of 
the art pushback equipment, such as: 
- 18 -
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a) Towbarless pushback vehicles " 
b) cordless communications equipment 
4.2.5 Where practicable, operational tests of new equipment., 
particularly cordless communications systems were to 
be conducted. 
4.3 Systems Diagram 
The following Systems Diagram was developed to focus 
attention on the likely variables impacting on aircraft 
pushback accident causation. 
Ground Engineer Unions 
Traditions and Influence 
Airline Traditions 
and Norms 
Operating Pressures" 
eg Schedule 
Automation 
GROUND ENGINEER 
REMOVED FROM 
HAZARD ZONE 
Cordless—"New Equipment/ 
Headsets Technology 
Engineer Engineer Awareness-
Training of Hazards 
Economics 
(Funding) 
•Pushback Procedures 
Type of Aircraft 
(Wide or Narrow Body) 
Ethnicism 
(Language 
Proficiency] 
ACCIDENT FREE 
PUSHBACK OPERATION 
GROUND ENGINEER 
REQUIRED TO WORK 
IN HAZARD ZONE 
Effective 
•Communications 
'Engineer Ability 
Suitability of 
Existing Equipment 
Failsafe Design 
Aviation Legislation & 
International Standards 
FIGURE 6 
Systems Diagram 
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4.4 . Variables and their Operational Definitions 
Appendix 5 details the identified Variables and their 
Operational Definitions derived from the Figure 6 Systems 
Diagram. 
4.5. Methodology 
4.5.1 Pushback Accident Reports 
As Hogwood (1992) contained no information concerning 
accident causation, the need to obtain further details 
of those accidents was apparent. 
Of the twenty-four airlines identified in Hogwood 
(1992), twenty were considered to be possible sources 
of further information. Four airlines, Flying Tigers, 
Pan American, Aero-Condor and Brazilia had either 
ceased operations or contact details could not be 
found at the time. 
Two of the airlines which had experienced accidents, 
Ansett Australia and Saudia, provided copies of their 
accident reports before letters were sent requesting 
information from them. 
A standard letter was developed to request accident 
report details from the other 18 target airlines. An 
example of the letter is at Appendix No. 6. Appendix 
No. 7 is a list of recipients of the letter. 
- 20 -
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To maximise the probability of. response to these 
letters, a letterhead was produced which included the 
logos of all sponsoring organisations: Australasian 
Airline Ground Safety Council, Australasian Airline 
Flight Safety Council and the Victorian Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health, Ballarat University 
College. An example of the letterhead is at Appendix 
No. 6. 
4.5.2 Interviews 
4.5.2.1 Semi-rstructured Format 
As it was considered likely that the interview 
phase of data collection would extend over a 
period of arourtd one year, a semi-structured 
format was used to provide a common base line 
for all interviews. 
A copy of the standard Participant Interview 
Record (PIR) developed for the interviews is 
at Appendix No. 8. The content of the PIR 
was derived directly from the Variables and 
their Operational Definitions outlined in 
paragraph 4.4 above. 
During each interview, the interviewee was 
asked all questions listed on the PIR and 
responses were recorded by the interviewer in 
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writing. 
At the completion of the standard questions on 
the PIR, two further questions were asked of 
all interviewees. These were: 
Has your organisation experienced a 
pushback accident? If so, what were the 
. details? 
In your opinion, what measures does the 
aviation industry need to introduce to 
prevent further pushback accidents? 
All interviews were conducted by the writer. 
However, where the interviewees could not 
speak English, the services of an interpreter 
was utilized. 
4.5.2.2 Populations 
In order to obtain a balance of opinion on the 
issue, a number of people involved in each 
aspect of the pushback operation were 
interviewed. These were: Despatchers, 
Pushback Drivers and Aircrew. In addition, 
representatives of a major aircraft 
manufacturer and an engine manufacturer were 
interviewed. 
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a) Airline Safety Professionals 
Safety Professionals from 24 airlines 
were interviewed. Appendix No 9 is a 
contact address list of those interviewed. 
b) Despatchers 
Fifteen Despatchers were interviewed. 
Appendix No. 10 is a contact address listA 
of those interviewed. 
c) Pushback Drivers 
.Ten Pushback Drivers were interviewed. 
Appendix No. 11 is a contact address list 
of those interviewed. 
d) Aircrew 
Five Aircrew members were interviewed. 
Appendix No. 12 is a contact address list 
of those interviewed. 
e) Aircraft and Aircraft Engine Manufacturers 
A representative from an aircraft 
manufacturer and one from an aircraft 
engine manufacturer, were interviewed. 
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Appendix No. 13 is a contact address list 
of those interviewed. 
4.5.2.3 Interview Locations and Interviewee 
Demography 
To achieve a broad sample of the worldwide 
aviation community, interviews were conducted 
in 11 cities in 8 countries. Appendix No. 14 
lists the locations interviews were conducted. 
Interviewees came from 25 cities in 16 
countries. These are listed at Appendix No. 
15. 
4.5.3 Operational Trials: Cordless Communications 
Representatives from Motorola Communications 
Authorised Premier Dealer, Craig Ross Communications 
PTY LTD were interviewed and aircraft pushback 
communications were discussed. The Principal of the 
company, Mr Craig Ross agreed to research the issue 
with a view to adaption of existing Motorola Trunked 
Radio technology to this aircraft application. 
Motorola conducted several trials of Motorola radios 
in conjuction with Boeing B737 aircraft at Melbourne 
Airport. Craig Ross Communications intended to 
deliver a number of radios for operational pushback 
testing by Qantas Airways. 
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4.6 Limitations 
4.6.1 Accident Occurrence Rates 
The lack of any information concerning the annual 
numbers of pushbacks carried out worldwide, made 
interpretation of accident occurrence rates difficult. 
As a result, annual comparisons Were carried out on 
raw data with no consideration of changes in annual 
pushback frequency, if any. 
4.6.2 Size of Sample Populations 
It was recognised that the populations which would be 
reached using the personal interview method of data 
collection were smaller than that which could 
have been achieved using other methods, such as 
a questionnaire. However, the personal interview 
permitted more detailed information to be obtained 
from subjects and subjects were more readily able to 
express opinion. 
The size of the Safety Professional group was not 
considered to have caused any significant variation in 
result. The group represents over 10% of all 
International Air Transport Association member. 
airlines (217 members, Cooper (1993)) , and 69% of the 
airline members of the International Air Transport 
Executive Committee of the National Safety Council Of 
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America (35 airline members, Dembski (1992)). 
Numbers in the Despatcher, Aircrew and Pushback Driver 
groups were smaller than ideal. However, these groups 
proved more difficult with which to arrange formal 
interviews. 
4.6.3 Interview Language and Interpreters 
As mentioned above, where interviewees were unable to 
converse in English, interpreters were utilized. This 
occurred only in the Despatcher and Pushback Driver 
groups. All Safety Professional and Aircrew 
interviewees were able to converse in English. 
The use of interpreters is not believed to have skewed 
the results of interviews, but considerably lengthened 
interview duration due to the frequent need to 
re-state questions and clarify responses. 
. 4.6.4 Fidelity of Accident Investigations 
There was considerable variation in the depth of 
information available and length of pushback accident 
reports obtained. 
Information contained in the reports was taken at 
face value. There was little or no opportunity to 
qualify or confirm information in written accident 
reports. 
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4.6.5 Researcher Bias 
As with all interviews there was a need to guard 
against asking questions Which may have lead the 
interviewee. This was of particular concern due to 
the strong personal opinions of the researcher in this 
subject area. 
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5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
5.1 Analysis of Accident Reports 
Annual distribution of the pushback accidents is depicted in 
Figure 7. Similar to Hogwood (1992) information (see Figure 
5), frequency of accident occurrence appeared to have 
increased since 1988, with 21 of the 46 accidents having 
occurred in the last 4 years of the study period. This 
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similarity was no doubt due to the inclusion in both studies 
of the same accidents, those which occurred up to 1991 and 
involved injuries to Despatchers. Such injury to Despatcher 
accidents constituted 76% of all accidents included in this 
study (see Figure 8). The additional events reviewed in 
this study, those in which other persons were injured (see 
Figure 9) and one in which no-one was injured, were also 
unevenly distributed, with half having occurred in the last 
3 years of the study period. 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964 -1992: 
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The reason for the apparent increase in pushback accident 
occurrence in recent years did not become apparent. 
In comparison of Hogwood (1992) data (Figure 5) and this 
study (Figure 7) there is an apparent anomaly, that is 
the inclusion in Hogwood (1992) of a pushback accident in 
1968. In fact, the accident is the same one that is listed 
by Dial (1993), Hogwood (1993) and confirmed by Horn (1993 
Interview) in this study, as having occurred in 1964. 
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5.1.1 Nature and Severity of Injury 
Figure 10 shows that injuries sustained in the 
pushback accidents were predominantly severe. 31 
(67%) of the 46 accidents, resulted in limb amputation 
injuries or fatalities. This overall severe trend was 
consistent within each personnel category: 71% of 
Despatchers, 100% of Wingwalkers, 67% of 
Assistant/Observers and 100% of Drivers injured 
experienced limb amputation or fatal injuries. 
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This result was not unexpected considering the 
application of the Viner (1982) "Extended Energy 
Damage Model". In each of these accidents the control 
of the energy contained in the aircraft and tug system 
was lost and energy transfer to the persons involved 
occurred. Severity of injury was consistent with 
energy transfer far exceeding the ability of the 
injured persons to absorb the energy. 
NOSEWHEELS MAIN WHEELS PUSHBACK TUG TOWBAR OTHER 
AGENCY 
FIGURE 11 
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It is this often high severity of injury resulting 
from pushback accidents, where-in lies the health and 
safety significance of the events. 
5.1.2 Involvement of the Aircraft 
Given that Despatchers were injured in 76% of 
accidents under study, it was expected that a high 
percentage of the accidents would have had the the 
aircraft nose wheels as the Agency of Injury. As 
Figure 11 shows, this was the case. In fact, 3 0 of 
the 4 6 accidents (65%) were the result of nosewheel 
impact or run over. In addition, a further 4 
accidents involved the aircraft main wheels as the 
agency of injury. This brought the total aircraft 
involvement in injury causation to 74% of the accidents, 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964 -1992: 
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Wide body aircraft were involved in 74% of all 
accidents (see Figure 12) and 91% of those where the 
aircraft nose or main wheels were the agency of injury 
(see Figure 13). 
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5.1.3 Involvement of the Pushback Tug and/or Towbar 
Figure 11 shows that the pushback tug and/or towbar 
were involved as the Agency of Injury in 11 (24%) of 
the 46 accidents. While this percentage is small by 
comparison to aircraft involvement, Figure 14 shows 
that narrow body aircraft featured much more 
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prominently in accidents where the pushback tug or 
towbar were involved in causation. 8 (73%) of the 11 
tug or towbar related accidents involved narrow bodied 
aircraft. 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964 -1992: 
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5.1.4 Common Causal Factors 
Table 1 lists the causal factors of the 46 accidents 
(see Appendix No. 2) reviewed by this study and their 
frequency of incidence. 
65 of the 90 factors extracted from the accident 
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TABLE 1 
Frequency of Causal Factors 
Human Related Factors: 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
Person Out of Position 
Person Stumbled, Tripped or Fell 
Inadvertent Pushback Tug Movement 
Distraction by Other Extraneous Factors 
Inattention to Task 
Person Jumped Towbar 
Person Fell from Towbar 
Lack of Experience 
Poor Communications 
Extended Duty Period , 
Lack of Training 
Haste 
Connected Towbar To Wrong End of Tug 
Fault of Personnel 
Equipment Related Factors: 
Headset Cord Tangled or Trapped 
Short Headset Cord 
Person Trapped by Towbar 
Equipment Failure 
Procedure Related Factors: 
Person Required to Walk Beside Aircraft 
Distraction by Engine Observation Requii 
Other Factors: 
Poor Weather 
Not Known 
Total: 
' - . 
Total: 
Nose 
rements 
Total: 
Total: 
Grand Total: 
f 
18 
10 
8 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
65
4 
2 
2 
1 
9 
5 
5 
10 
1 
5 
6 
90 
reports attribute accident causation, in part, to the 
failure of a person involved in the operation. By 
comparison, equipment was considered to be involved in 
causation on 9 occasions. There was only one citation 
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of a factor external to the immediate operation being 
involved in causation. That was one mention (Appendix 
No 2, Accident 45) that poor weather conditions 
existed at the time of the accident. 
There were only 10 occasions where the operating 
procedures in place at the time were considered to 
have been involved in accident causation. These 
included 5 reports which suggested that the need for a 
person to walk beside the aircraft during pushback 
should be removed, and 5 which suggested the need for 
the Despatcher to monitor aircraft engine start was 
unnecessary. 
TABLE 2 
PERSONNEL AT RISK 
METHOD 1 
METHOD 2 
METHOD .3 
METHOD 4 
METHOD 5 
METHOD 6 
NUMBER OF 
PEOPLE IN 
PUSHBACK 
CREW 
1 
2 
2 
3 
4 
4 
NUMBER OF 
PEOPLE REQUIRED 
TO WALK BESIDE 
AIRCRAFT 
Nil 
Nil 
1 
2 
2 
3 
DESCRIPTION 
Tug Driver Communicating with Aircrew 
Despatcher in Tug With Driver 
Despatcher Walking Beside Aircraft Nose 
Tug Driver Communicating with Aircrew 
Plus up to 2 Wingwalkers 
Despatcher in Tug with Driver 
Plus up to 2 Wingwalkers 
Despatcher Walking Beside Aircraft Nose 
Plus up to 2 Wingwalkers 
NUMBER OF 
AIRLINES 
(n-26*j. 
3* 
2 
5 
2* 
2 
12 
Two airlines reported 
on some operations, whi 
utilizing procedures which gavfc the conmunications role to the Driver (ie Method 1 and 4) 
le they reverted to having a Despatcher walk beside the aircraft on other occasions. 
37 -
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5.2 Results of Interviews 
5.2.1 Safety Professionals 
The following details the outcomes of the interviews 
of the 24 airline safety professionals who 
participated in this study. 
5.2.1.1 Number of Personnel at Risk 
Table 2 gives details of the number and 
category of personnel involved in the 
pushback operations of the 24 airlines. 
Half of the 24 airline safety professionals 
reported that their airlines' used Method 6 
and required up to 3 personnel to walk beside 
the aircraft during pushback. This was the 
maximum number routinely exposed to the 
hazards associated with pushback, no-one 
reported using procedures which required more 
than 4 personnel in a pushback crew. 
Only 5 safety professionals advised that their 
airlines' used Method 1 or 2 procedures and 
required no personnel to walk beside the 
aircraft. However, 2 of these reported that 
they switched to these procedures following 
pushback accidents which had injured 
Despatchers. 
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5.2.1.2 Communications Systems In Use 
None of the airlines in the interview group 
were using cordless communications routinely 
between the Despatcher and the Aircrew (see 
Table 3). One airline used cordless 
communications only in poor weather conditions 
to minimise the possibility of electric shock 
to the Despatcher, if the aircraft was struck 
by lightning. Three airlines had evaluated 
cordless systems and had rejected them as 
unsuitable. 
O • i • 
All the airlines which used more than 1 person 
in the pushback crew, had only hand signal 
procedures in place for communication between 
members of the ground crew. 
TABLE 3 
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IN USE 
TYPE OF 
SYSTEM 
Hardwire Headset 
Cordless Headset 
Hand Signals 
(Between Pushback Crew Members 
NUMBER OF 
AIRLINES 
(n=24) 
24 
21 
Only in Poor.Weather Operations 
Of the 9 airlines which either have the Driver 
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communicating with the Aircrew, or the 
Despatcher seated inside the pushback tug , 
beside the Driver, only 4 have wired 
their towbars to transfer communications 
signals from the aircraft ground interphone 
panel into the tug. The other 5 airlines " 
procedures required the headset lead to drape 
between the tug and aircraft and swing above 
the towbar. 
5.2.1.3 Training Provided to Pushback Personnel 
17 of the 24 airlines had structured pushback 
training programs in place (see Table 4). 
These programs included instruction on 
pushback hazards and accident prevention as 
well as the operational technique aspects of 
the task. Seven airlines used only on-the-job 
instruction for pushback personnel. 
TABLE 4 
TYPES OF PUSHBACK TRAINING IN PLACE 
TYPE OF PROGRAM 
Structured Initial Programs 
On-The-Job Training Only 
Routine Recurrent Training 
Recurrent Training Only After 
Extended Absence 
NUMBER OF 
AIRLINES 
(n=24) 
17 
7 
7 
2 
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. 1 
All 24 airlines advised having strict 
procedures for pushback staff selection which 
resulted in only persons having prior 
experience in other aspects of aircraft 
handling being selected. 
Only 7 airlines had any routine recurrent 
training or assessment programs in place. A 
further 2 provided recurrent instruction only 
when staff had been absent from pushback 
operations for extended periods. 
FIGURE 15 
MAN GHH Wide Body Towbarless Pushback Tug 
(Attached to Aircraft Nosewheels) 
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5.2.1.4 Staff Rest 
23 airlines from the study group had 
industrial situations which permitted a 
duration of days off proportional to the 
length of the rostered duty period worked by 
pushback personnel. Most common were: 
8 hour day - 5 days on - 2 days'off 
10 hour day - 4 days on - 3 days off 
12 hour day - 4 days on - 4 days off 
However, no airlines had safety limits on the 
amount of overtime which could be worked, and 
left the responsibility of ensuring adequate 
rest was taken to the individual and the 
supervisor. 
FIGURE 16 
MAN GHH Narrow Body Towbarless Pushback Tug 
(Attached to Aircraft Nosewheels) 
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5.2.1.5 Types of Pushback Tugs 
Use of towbarless pushback tractors was found 
to be limited. Only 3 of the airlines in this 
study (Lufthansa, Scandinavian Airlines and 
Swissair) were using them. The other 21 
airlines used only conventional pushback tugs 
and towbars. However, 3 airlines (British 
Airways, Sabena and Czechoslovac Airlines) 
were either evaluating towbarless tugs or 
planning their introduction. 
> 
FIGURE 17 
FMT Remotely Operated Towbarless Pushback Tug 
(Attached to Aircraft Nosewheels) 
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The Safety Professionals interviewed from the 
3 airlines using towbarless tugs all felt that 
there were safety benefits in their use. The 
number of people needed in the pushback crew 
was reduced, the hazard zone around the 
aircraft nosewheels and tug was reduced in 
size and the nosewheels and tug moved as a 
single unit. 
Figures 15 and 16 show two types of MAN GHH 
towbarless pushback tugs used by Lufthansa, 
Figure 17 shows an in-ground FMT pushback 
system used by Scandinavian Airlines and 
Figure 18 is the Powerpush towbarless pushback 
tug being introduced by Sabena Airlines. 
FIGURE 18 
Powerpush Narrow Body Towbarless Pushback Tug 
(Attaches to Aircraft Mainwheels) 
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5.2.1.6 Equipment Maintenance 
All 24 airlines in the study group had 
extensive equipment preventive maintenance 
programs in place. All pushback tugs, towbars 
and communications equipment were routinely 
inspected and maintained. 
TABLE 5 
AMBIENT CONDITIONS: A FACTOR IN PUSHBACK SAFETY? 
OPINION OF SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
NUMBER OF 
RESPONSES 
(n=24) 
Not a Pushback Safety Factor 
Pushback Operations Should Cease in Poor Weather 
Poor Weather Increases Pushback Hazards 
Pushback Staff Use Aircraft As Shelter in Rain 
Pushback Hazards Increase at Night in Darkness 
17 
3 
2 
1 
1 
5.2.1.7 Involvement of Ambient Conditions 
As Table 5 shows, the majority opinion of 
Safety Professionals was that ambient 
conditions were not an influence on safety of 
pushback operations. Some airlines routinely 
operated from airports in the arctic with 
conditions of ice and snow and temperatures 
below 0°C, and also from airports in the 
tropics with high humidity, and temperatures 
- 45 -
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
Causes and Prevention 
over 40°C, or dry and dusty desert locations 
with outside temperatures over 50°C. 
Only 4 Safety Professionals felt that some 
ambient conditions (poor weather and poor 
light) had an adverse impact on pushback 
safety. 
5.2.1.8 Influence of Operational Pressures 
Opinion of the Safety Professional group was 
split over whether or not the influence of 
operational pressures had an adverse effect on 
pushback safety (see Table 6). 
TABLE 6 
INFLUENCE OF OPERATIONAL PRESSURES 
OPINION OF SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
NUMBER OF 
RESPONSES 
(n=24) 
Not. a Pushback Safety Factor 
Haste Increases Pushback Hazards 
10 
14 
The predominant opinion amongst those who 
considered that operational pressures did not 
effect safety, was the suggestion that there 
was no schedule pressure applied to the 
operation. Aircraft compliance with schedule 
was measured by the time the aircraft departed 
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the terminal. Therefore, an airline's on time 
performance was not affected in any way by 
speed of pushback and as a result, it was 
argued, pushbacks were conducted with no 
extraneous operational pressures. 
The opposing view that haste was a factor 
affecting pushback safety, was based on the 
premise that schedule disruptions often placed 
pressure on ground crews to carry out tasks 
more rapidly to regain schedule. Particularly 
when more than the usual number of aircraft 
were on the ground and required handling, it 
was argued, equipment and manpower limitations 
often placed pressure on staff to speed up the 
work process to despatch one aircraft, so that 
the crew could move on to the next waiting 
aircraft. This pressure was thought to also 
impact on pushback operations. 
5.2.1.9 Prevention Consensus Matrix 
The majority of safety professionals favoured 
engineering solutions to pushback accident 
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TABLE 7 
PUSHBACK ACCIDENT PREVENTION: SAFETY PROFESSIONALS CONSENSUS 
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION 
NUMBER OF 
RESPONSES 
(n=74) 
ENGINEERING 
SOLUTIONS 
Cordless Headset . 
Towbarless Pushback Tugs 
Move Despatcher into Pushback Tug 
Beside Driver 
1 Person Pushback Operation 
(Driver Communicating with Aircrew) 
PROCEDURAL 
SOLUTIONS 
MANAGEMENT 
SOLUTIONS 
Remove Despatcher Engine Monitoring 
Duties 
Start Aircraft Engines Only After 
Pushout Complete 
Minimise the Number of people in 
Pushback Crew 
Slow the Pushback Operation Down 
Enforce a "No Go" Zone Around the 
Pushback Tug and Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Develop Better Procedures 
Provide Better Training 
Improve Supervision 
16 
14 
11 
1 
1 
6 
4 
causation. Table 7 shows that introduction of 
cordless headsets and towbarless pushback tugs 
were the preferred solutions of more than half 
of the study group. 83% (20) saw the need to 
move the Despatcher into the tug, either by 
putting the Despatcher in the tug beside the 
Driver (ll) or by giving the Driver the 
communications duties and adopting a one 
person operation (9). 
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The most predominant procedural solution was 
to remove the need for Despatchers to monitor 
engine start. 6 Safety Professionals 
considered this an unnecessary distraction and 
its removal allowed the Despatcher to 
concentrate on the operational aspects of the 
pushback, including aircraft and tug movement. 
This reasoning was also apparent in the group 
which felt that engine start should be delayed 
until the pushout was complete. 
Less than 25% of the group felt that improving 
training or supervision was a necessary 
prevention measure. 
5.2.2 Despatchers 
The following details the outcomes of the interviews 
of the 15 Despatchers (see Appendix No. 10) who 
participated in this study. 
5.2.2.1 The Need For Good Visibility 
11 of the 15 Despatchers felt that it would 
not be possible to put the Despatcher in the 
pushback tug. The reasons suggested for this 
opinion were the need to observe: 
a) observe aircraft engines during engine 
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start and: 
.advise the aircrew of engine Nt rotation 
. observe any start abnormalities, such as 
fires or compressor stalls. 
b) see behind the aircraft to ensure clearance 
from obstructions. 
c) Monitor Wingwalkers to exchange hand 
signals when necessary. 
V 
Only 3 Despatchers reported having a 
preference for riding on or in the tug. 
However, each expressed the need for the 
Despatcher to be outside the tug when ever 
there was a known engine problem or a start 
abnormality was anticipated. 
Two Despatchers felt that the need to observe 
engine starts was redundant with modern engine 
instrumentation technology. They suggested 
that as aircrew are provided with positive 
engine N, rotation indication in the cockpit, 
the need for Despatchers to observe engine 
start during pushback was no longer necessary. 
Therefore, they argued, engine observation 
requirements should not be an impediment to 
putting the Despatcher inside the pushback 
tug. 
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5.2.2.2 Training Received by Despatchers 
All 15 Despatchers reported their airlines 
having extensive initial pushback training 
programs in place. These programs included 
both procedural and hazard awareness , 
instruction, in addition to extensive 
on-the-job training. However, none of the 
Despatcher group reported their Airlines 
having any detailed recurrent training 
programs, instead standards surveillance was 
maintained as a routine line supervision 
function. 
5.2.2.3 Prevention Consensus Matrix 
The maj ority of Despatchers favoured 
engineering solutions to pushback accident 
causation (see Table 8). However, 5 
Despatchers felt that there was no problem 
with existing pushback systems which required 
the Despatcher to walk beside the aircraft. 
This group felt that a professional Despatcher 
should be aware of the position of the 
aircraft and tug at all times and thereby 
avoid an accident. 
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TABLE 8 
PUSHBACK ACCIDENT PREVENTION: DESPATCHER CONSENSUS 
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION 
NUMBER OF 
RESPONSES 
(n=16) 
ENGINEERING 
SOLUTIONS 
Cordless Headset 
Move Despatcher into Pushback Tug 
Beside Driver 
8 
3 
No Solution Needed: Present Pushback Systems Adequate 
While 8 of the Despatchers felt that cordless 
headsets may be an advantage, there was a need 
expressed to overcome perceived radio 
interference difficulties. Six of these 8 
Despatchers felt that the advantage of a 
cordless headset was to permit them freedom of 
movement during pushback, the other 2 were 
among those who favoured putting the 
Despatcher into, the tug beside the Driver. 
None of the Despatchers suggested moving to a 
one person operation by giving the Pushback 
Driver the responsibility for communications 
with the aircrew. 
Driver 
5.2.3 Pushback Drivers 
The following details outcomes of the interviews of 
the 10 Pushback Drivers (see Appendix No. 11) who 
participated in this study. 
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5.2.3.1 Training 
All Drivers advised that their organisations 
primarily used on-the-job instruction for 
pushback Driver training and none had routine 
recurrent training programs in place. 
5.2.3.2 Prevention Consensus 
There was considerable commonality of opinion 
amongst the Pushback Drivers interviewed. All 
felt that it would be beneficial to move the 
Despatcher into or oh the pushback tug. It 
was suggested that often Despatchers walked 
too close to the pushback tug or nosewheels 
and this required Drivers to divert attention 
away from the task of positioning the 
aircraft. 
5 Drivers reported that they had experienced 
occasions where Despatchers had jumped over 
the towbar during pushout. 
All Drivers expressed concern over not being 
in the communications loop with the Despatcher 
and Aircrew. 
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5.2.4 Aircrew 
The following details the outcomes of the interviews 
of the 5 Aircrew (see Appendix No. 12) who 
participated in this study. 
5.2.4.1 Engine Start Considerations 
All 5 Aircrew advised that there was no need 
for ground staff to advise the cockpit of 
engine N} rotation during start up. This 
practise was required in early high by-pass 
ratio gas turbine engines. These engines.were 
fitted with "blade counters" which could not 
distinguish direction of fan rotation and gave 
Aircrew a positive rotation indication in the 
cockpit even when the fan was rotating 
backwards in tailwinds. Modern engine 
technology provides accurate positive 
indication to aircrew, and accordingly, advice 
from the Despatcher would only be necessary if 
the aircraft was being operated with an N, 
tachometer unserviceable. 
There was no objection to the possibility of 
putting the Despatcher into or on the pushback 
tug while the pushback was in motion, provided 
the Despatcher's visibility was not impaired. 
All Aircrew reported a reliance on the 
Despatcher to ensure clearance behind the 
- 54 -
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
Causes and Prevention 
aircraft, and to give early warning of 
anything unuSual during engine start, 
particularly fires. Although, that type of 
occurrence was considered to be rare. 
5.2.5 Aircraft and Engine Manufacturers 
5.2.5.1 Engine Start Considerations 
* Ehgine Manufacturer Rolls Royce Service 
Representative, Mr P. Brennan confirmed that 
there was no requirement for advice to aircrew 
concerning engine N,, rotation. Such a 
requirement was possibly left over from 
earlier aircraft and engine technology, 
although Rolls Royce has never reguired such 
advice for its wide body aircraft engines. 
5.2.5.2 Prevention Considerations 
Dial (1993 Interview) advised that Boeing had 
been researching pushback accidents since 
1991. A survey of airlines by Boeing had 
suggested the following pushback prevention 
mechanisms: 
a) Enforce a nose gear "no go" hazard zone. 
b) Enforce a main gear "no-go" hazard zone. 
c) Disallow Despatcher to cross towbar. 
d) Improve ramp conditions. 
e) Transfer communications duties to the 
Pushback Tug Driver. 
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5.3 Cordless Communications Trial Results. 
It was disappointing that the development of a trial 
cordless headset by Motorola Communications Inc. was not 
completed in time for operational tests to be conducted as 
part of this research project. 
Craig Ross communications have advised that development of 
an adaption of the Motorola Trunk Radio technology for use 
in pushback communications will be continued. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
It was apparent that the maj or thrust of pushback accident 
prevention in the past has been focused on personnel 
behaviour control, and the literature has supported this 
emphasis (see for example Barnett (1990), Anderson (1991) 
and Jackson (1993)). 
However, as previously suggested, reliance on procedural 
compliance as the sole barrier to accident occurrence has 
placed accident prevention in jeopardy by a range of human 
behavioural traits, such as distraction and concentration 
lapse. 
As Table 1 shows, 65 of the 90 factors mentioned in the 
accident reports reviewed in this study were citations of 
failures of the human element. 
While there was no doubt that these failures were factors in 
causation of the accidents, their occurrence, given the low 
reliability of procedural controls (see Department of labour 
(1990)), should have been entirely predictable. In 
addition, these factors were invariably the last in the 
event sequence leading up to the accidents, and while they 
were no doubt the most obvious to the investigators due to 
their immediate effect, they were almost certainly not 
factors in isolation. 
It is well known that accidents are the result of 
sequences of events (see for example Lee (1993), 
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Reason (1991a) and Dell (1987)), of which no one is 
more significant from a causation viewpoint than any 
other, and prior removal of any one is likely to 
prevent the accident from occurring. 
Therefore, to make in-roads to "Understanding-pushback 
accident causation, and develop meaningful prevention 
strategies, it was necessary to look past those factors with 
immediate effect and challenge the very manner in which the 
operation was expected to be performed. 
In only 5 of the 46 accidents (see Table 1) reviewed in this 
study was there any apparent attempt to look past the 
causation factors with immediate effect. Only in those 5 
accidents was the need for personnel to walk beside the 
aircraft during pushback questioned. As suggested by Vogt 
et al (1993), such procedural need was"unnecessary and 
unsafe". 
Not withstanding, the aviation industry did not appear 
to have grasped the significance of this issue. Half of the 
24 airlines surveyed in this study (see Table 2), and 20 of 
the 32 airlines surveyed by Hayes (1993) used procedures 
which required personnel to walk beside the aircraft during 
pushback. 
The predominant opinions of the Safety Professionals 
interviewed were that engineering solutions were required. 
Minimising the risk of injury by use of towbarless pushback 
tugs, by moving the personnel away from the aircraft through 
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use of cordless communications, or by putting them into the 
tug, were most often suggested (see Table 7). 
It is suggested that the reason these engineering solutions 
have not yet been broadly applied by industry lay in the 
opinion of-two of the other industry groups: The majority 
of Despatchers expressed concern at the prospect of being 
required to ride in the pushback tug due to the need to 
observe aspects of the pushback, particularly engine start, 
signals from Wingwalkers and to ensure clearance from 
obstructions. 
The Aircrew group supported the need for the Despatcher to 
see behind the aircraft to ensure clearance and also 
considered that the Despatcher had a role in advising any 
unusual event during engine start, particularly fire. 
However, those Aircrew interviewed did not support the need 
for Despatchers to confirm Nt rotation during engine start. 
Five Safety Professionals from the study group reported 
their airlines used pushback procedures that featured either 
1 person operations with the pushback Driver in 
communication with the cockpit (as was suggested by 
Anderson (1991)), or 2 person operations with 
both Driver and Despatcher seated in the pushback tug. None 
of these airlines reported any difficulties with their 
operations, nor did they report having experienced any 
pushback accidents since introducing the procedures. 
It was apparent that whether or not a Wingwalker was 
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required was largely governed by factors external to the 
pushbacks themselves. Poorly designed aircraft bays, 
traffic congestion, poor equipment parking and substandard 
housekeeping were factors which influenced the need for 
Wingwalkers. 19 of the Safety Professionals reported that 
their airlines used Wingwalkers whenever these external 
factors were apparent. However, the 5 airlines which use 
either a 1 person operation or 2 persons in the tug only, 
each had expended considerable effort to address these 
factors to minimise, almost to zero, the number of occasions 
when Wingwalkers were required. The Scandinavian Airlines 
operation at Stockholm's Arlando Airport and Northwest 
Airlines operation at Minneapolis/St Paul Airport in USA 
were two examples cited of good airport design and 
housekeeping which removed the need for wingwalkers during 
pushback. 
One of the key factors in those accidents which injured 
Wingwalkers, was the inability of the Despatcher to 
communicate with them during the pushback. Hand signals 
were the only method of communication with them and this 
proved inadequate when the accidents sequences began. A 
suitable cordless communication system, with all pushback 
crew members and the Aircrew in the same communications 
loop, may have provided an opportunity for warning the 
individual of the impending danger, or perhaps stopping the 
pushback, which was not available with the existing hand 
signal communications system. 
As previously mentioned, none of the literature referred to 
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any safety benefits from use of towbarless pushback tugs. 
However, although only 3 airlines from the study group have 
introduced these tugs to their operations, the Safety 
Professionals of those airlines were convinced of their 
safety benefit. 
The removal of the towbar from the operation was considered 
to not only prevent that piece of equipment itself from 
directly causing injury, but also it removed the need for 
employees to connect or disconnect the towbar with the 
inherent run over dangers associated with these tasks. 
Minimisation of risk of injury to Pushback Drivers was 
considered to only be affected by the introduction of some 
towbarless pushback tug types. The 3 accidents which 
injured Drivers were all the result of inadvertent vehicle 
movement and the Drivers were each crushed between the tug 
and aircraft. As Figures 15 and 16 show, some towbarless 
tugs have Driver cabins similar to those which required 
towbars and Drivers using this equipment would still be at 
risk from injury if inadvertent tug movement occurred, 
particularly if aircraft brakes were set, the aircraft 
nose gear failed under the load and the aircraft fuselage 
fell down onto the pushback tug. 
However, some towbarless pushback systems were found not to 
put Drivers at risk. That is, those that remove the Driver 
from the vehicle and are operated remotely (see Figures 17 
and 18). 
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7. FINDINGS -
7.1 Findings Concerning the Pushback Accident Reports 
7.1.1 45% of the 46 known pushback accidents occurred in 
the last 4 years of the 29 year study period. 
7.1.2 The reason for this apparent increase in accident 
occurrence did not become apparent. 
7.1.3 Injuries sustained in pushback accidents were 
predominantly severe with 67% having resulted in 
either limb amputation or fatal injuries. 
7.1.4 The Despatcher was injured in 76% of the known 
'•"••-. pushback accidents. 
7.1.5 74% of pushback accidents involved the aircraft as 
the agency of injury: 65% aircraft nosewheel runover 
and 9% mainwheel runover. 
7.1.6 wide body aircraft were involved in 74% of all 
pushback accidents and 91% of those where the 
aircraft nosewheels or mainwheels were the agency of 
injury. This was consistent with the suggestions of 
Anderson (1991). 
7.1.7 Narrow body aircraft were involved in 73% of the 
accidents in which the pushback tug or towbar were 
the agency of injury. 
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7.1.8 72% of the 90 causation factors cited in the pushback 
accident reports were attributed to failure of 
members of the pushback crew. 
7.1.9 Only 10% of the causation factors in the pushback 
accident reports were attributed to equipment 
shortcomings. 
7.1.10 Less than 6% of the factors cited in the reports 
questioned the need for a person to walk beside the 
aircraft during pushback. 
7.1.11 Only 6% of the causation factors were attributed to 
the procedures related to aircraft engine start 
monitoring by Despatchers. 
7.2 Findings Concerning the Safety Professional Interviews 
7.2.1 9 of the 24 airlines represented by the Safety 
Professionals used pushback procedures which required 
either the Driver to communicate with the Aircrew or 
the Despatcher to ride in the tug beside the Driver. 
7.2.2 The procedures of 12 of the 24 airlines required up 
to 3 people (1 Despatcher and 1 or 2 Wingwalkers) to 
walk beside the aircraft during pushback. 
7.2.3 All of the 24 airlines routinely utilized hardwire 
headsets for communications between the Despatcher 
and Aircrew during pushback operations. 
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7.2.4 17 of the 24 airlines had structured training 
programs in place for personnel initial pushback 
training. The remaining 7 airlines used extensive 
on-the-job training for this purpose. 
7.2.5 Only 9 airlines had any form of recurrent. training or 
ongoing formalised standards appraisal for pushback 
crew members* 
7.2.6 Normal shift patterns of all 24 airlines appeared to 
provide adequate rest period for pushback personnel. 
21 of the airlines from the study group used 
conventional pushback tugs arid towbars. 
• . • - • • 
• - • • • 
Towbarless pushback tugs were considered by the 
Safety Professionals of the 3 airlines using them, as 
having a number of safety benefits; the number of 
pushback crew members was reduced, the size of the 
aircraft nosewheel and tug hazard zone was reduced, 
and the towbar itself was removed as a possible 
agency of injury. 
Remotely operated towbarless tugs had the 
* • 
additional advantage of eliminating the risk to 
Pushback Drivers, by removing the Driver from the 
operation. 
All 24 airlines had extensive equipment preventive 
maintenance programs in place* 
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7.2.11 17 of the 24 Safety Professionals considered that 
ambient conditions did not play a role in pushback 
accident causation. 
7.2.12 Opinion on influence of operational pressures, such 
as need for on-time performance, was split. 14 of 
the 24 Safety Professionals felt haste was a concern 
in pushback safety. 
7.2.13 Engineering solutions were favoured by most of the 
Safety professionals. 16 favoured cordless headsets, 
14 favoured towbarless pushback tugs, 11 favoured 
reconfiguring equipment to move the Despatcher into 
the tug and 9 favoured reconfiguring equipment to 
allow a 1 person operation. 
7.2.14 The predominant procedural solution suggested was the 
removal of Despatcher engine start monitoring duties 
during the pushback. 
7.3 Findings Concerning the Despatcher Interviews 
7.3.1 11 of the 15 Despatchers felt it would not be 
possible to move into the pushback tug because of the 
need to observe aircraft engines for start anomalies, 
. call N, rotation to aircrew, monitor clearance from 
obstructions and exchange hand signals with 
Wingwalkers. 
- 65 -
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
Causes and Prevention 
7.3.2 All Despatchers reported that their airlines had 
extensive initial training programs in place, 
however, none had any formal recurrent training 
programs. 
7.3.3 8 of the 15 Despatchers considered that cordless 
headsets may be beneficial. 
7.3.4 Only 3 Despatchers felt that moving the Despatcher 
into the pushback tug was a possible prevention 
strategy. 
7.3.5 5 Despatchers did not see the need for any prevention 
strategies other than ongoing Despatcher awareness 
of aircraft and tug position. 
7.4 Findings Concerning the Pushback Driver Interviews 
7.4.1 All Drivers reported their airlines used on-the-job 
instruction for Pushback Driver training. None had 
routine recurrent programs in place. 
7.4.2 All Drivers felt there was benefit in moving the 
Despatcher into the pushback tug. 
7.4.3 All Drivers expressed concern at not being able to 
communicate with the Despatcher.and Aircrew. 
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7.5 Findings Concerning the Aircrew Interviews 
7.5.1 All 5 Aircrew felt there was no need for the 
Despatcher to monitor and call engine N, rotation 
during engine start. 
7.5.2 Moving the Despatcher into the pushback vehicle was 
supported by all 5 Aircrew, provided the Despatchers' 
ability to see behind the aircraft and observe any 
unusual events during engine start was not impaired. 
7.6 Findings Concerning the Aircraft and Engine Manufacturers 
Interviews 
7.6.1 The engine manufacturer representative confirmed that 
there was no requirement for any advice to Aircrew 
from outside the aircraft concerning N, rotation 
during engine start. 
7.6.2 The aircraft manufacturer representative indicated 
that their thrust for pushback accident prevention 
was, enforcement of "no-go" hazard zones around the 
aircraft wheels, not permitting Despatchers to cross 
the towbar during pushback, improving ramp 
conditions, and transferring communications duties to 
the Pushback Driver. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 General 
The problem investigated in this project was the causes of 
the 46 known pushback accidents worldwide from 1964 to 1992 
and the development of strategies to prevent their further 
occurrence. It was found that in the past, prevention 
emphasis was on control of behaviour of the persons involved 
. in the pushback operation and there was a direct correlation 
to this in the reported causation of the accidents. Most 
accidents were cited as having resulted from failure of one 
or more of the personnel involved to carry out their tasks 
in the prescribed manner. 
Based on the analysis of reports of the 46 accidents and 
results of interviews with 24 airline Safety Professionals, 
15 Despatchers, 5 Aircrew, 1 Aircraft Manufacturer and 1 
Engine Manufacturer, the Recommendations following in 
Section 9 were developed. 
The Recommendations were derived with the intention of 
transferring the emphasis away from the procedural and human 
compliance related remedies, toward the more reliable 
engineering based solutions. These engineering solutions 
were considered not only to have more human error 
tolerance than past remedies, but also to reduce ground crew 
duration of exposure to risk of injury during pushback. 
Engineering solutions detailed in Section 9 have been ranked 
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in preferred order, from those which provide the lowest risk 
of injury, but possibly high cost of introduction, to 
those with higher risks of injury but lower costs of 
introduction. 
The lowest injury risk method is recommended-as the most 
appropriate goal of the airline industry. However, as 
capital constraints may limit airlines' ability to adopt the 
higher cost engineering solutions in the short term, and a 
longer term gradual introduction may be necessary, there 
will remain a need to adopt one of the other recommended 
systems of work which minimise the risk of ground crew 
injury, but which take into consideration the pushback 
equipment and communications systems available. 
8.2 Determination of the Hypothesis 
Due to the failure of the historically predominant pushback 
accident prevention mechanism, that of reliance on personnel 
behaviour control and procedural compliance, all injured 
personnel were effectively provided no physical protection 
against the energy contained in the aircraft and tug 
systems. They were each injured as the direct result of 
that control mechanism failing and exposing them to that 
energy. Accordingly, the Hypothesis of this project (see 
Section 4) was considered to be proven. 
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9. RECOMMENDATIONS 
9
-
1
 Removal of the Need for Aircraft Engine Monitoring Duties 
As there was no need identified by this study for 
Despatchers to make engine N, calls during engine start, it 
is recommended that those airlines with this requirement 
remove it from their pushback procedures. 
Monitoring of engines for other start anomalies should be 
conducted from within the pushback tug, or when remotely 
operated pushback tugs are in use, from a position in front 
of the nose of the aircraft, behind the aircraft's direction 
of movement (see Figure 19). 
Position of 
Despatcher 
Direction of Movement 
Position Of Despatcher: Remote Operations 
FIGURE 19 
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9.2 Removal of the Need for Wingwalkers 
It is recommended that airlines and airport operators should 
review the layout of equipment parking and aircraft parking 
bays to minimise the number of occasions where Wingwalkers 
would be required. Good housekeeping and airport design 
should reduce the need for Wingwalkers to a minimum. 
On those occasions when Wingwalkers are necessary, there 
should be a requirement for radio communications between the 
Pushback Driver and/or the Despatcher to be provided. 
If cordless communications are available for Aircrew to 
Despatcher communications, the system should also be used 
for communications with the Wingwalkers. This would place 
all pushback crew members and Aircrew in the communications 
loop. If no cordless system is available for Despatcher to 
Aircrew communications, then a separate radio system should 
be provided for Wingwalker to Driver communications. This 
would facilitate WingWalker advice to the Driver of an 
impending obstruction to the pushback, or an alert to the 
Wingwalker from the Driver if the wingwalker strays from the 
correct position at the wingtip. 
9.3 Removal of Pushback Crew Members from the Area of Risk 
Due to the failure of procedural barriers and personnel 
behaviour control to prevent exposure to risk of injury 
during pushbacks, emphasis must be placed on removal of 
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personnel from the areas of risk. The following 
Recommendations were intended to address this prime 
objective. They are ranked in order from that which is 
considered to provide the lowest risk of injury, to that 
which has the highest residual risk, and are based on the 
number of persons required in the operation and exposed to 
the risk of injury. 
The risk differentiation between the Recommendations 9.3.1 
and 9.3.2 (Ranked 1 and 2), was based on the premise that 
the probability of a system failure resulting in a collision 
between the tug and aircraft is lower than a failure 
resulting from the Despatcher walking put of position into 
the path of the aircraft nosewheels, even though 
Recommendation 9.3.2 does not require the Despatcher to 
approach the aircraft except to disconnect the headset or 
cordless communications transceiver. 
All recommended methods of operation removed the need 
for a person to Walk beside the aircraft fuselage while the 
pushback was in motion and provided a system of work with 
lower risk of injury than total reliance on procedural and 
behavioural control.. 
Airlines should adopt a system of operation as high in the 
ranking scale (ie closest to No. l) as possible, dependent 
upon their pushback eguipment and capital resources 
available. 
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9.3.1 Operations with Driver Operated Towbarless 
Pushback Tug. Driver with Communications to 
Aircrew responsibilities using Hardwire 
Headset or Cordless Communications 
Ranked 1: 1 Person Operation 
Advantages: 
a) Does not require any personnel to walk 
beside the aircraft during pushback. 
b) Removal of the need for manual connection 
of the tug to the aircraft and removal of 
the towbar as a possible agency of injury. 
c) Permits the Driver to remain in the 
pushback tug and in communication with, 
the Aircrew, without the need to walk 
under .the aircraft except to disconnect 
the headset or communications transmitter 
from the aircraft. 
Disadvantages: 
a) High initial capital outlay on equipment. 
b) Driver remains exposed to injury should 
inadvertent aircraft movement occur while 
disconnecting communications from the 
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aircraft. 
c) Exposes Driver to injury should 
inadvertent tug or aircraft movement occur 
resulting in a collision between the tug 
and aircraft. 
9.3.2 Operations with Remotely Operated Towbarless 
Pushback Tug. Hardwire or Cordless 
Communications 
Ranked 2: 1 Person Operation 
Advantages: 
a) Complete removal of the Driver from the 
operation and therefore removal of that 
person from risk of injury. 
b) Removal of the need for manual connection 
of the tug to the aircraft and removal of , 
the towbar as a possible agency of injury. 
c) Permits the Despatcher to remain in view 
of, and in communication with, the Aircrew 
while, remaining in front of the aircraft 
nose behind the direction of movement (see 
Figure 19), without the need to walk under 
the aircraft except to disconnect the 
headset or cordless communications 
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transmitter from the aircraft. 
Disadvantages: 
a) High initial capital outlay on equipment. 
b) Despatcher remains exposed to injury 
should circumstances result in the 
despatcher walking ahead of the aircraft 
nosewheels at any time during the 
pushback. 
c) Despatcher remains exposed to injury 
should inadvertent aircraft movement occur 
while disconnecting communications from 
the aircraft. 
9.3.3 Operations with Conventional Pushback Tug and 
Towbar. Driver with Communications 
to Aircrew responsibilities using Hardwire 
Headset or Cordless Communications 
Ranked 3: 1 or 2 Person Operation 
Advantages: 
a) Does not require any personnel to walk 
beside the aircraft during pushback. 
b) Low initial capital outlay on equipment. 
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Disadvantages: 
a) May require an Assistant to ride in the 
tug during pushout and then disconnect the 
towbar from aircraft at completion of pushout. 
b) Assistant would be exposed to injury 
should inadvertent aircraft or tug 
movement occur while connecting or 
disconnecting the towbar and the tug. 
c) Crew member who disconnects communications 
from aircraft remains exposed to injury 
should inadvertent aircraft movement occur 
while disconnecting the communications. 
d) Exposes Driver and Assistant to injury 
should inadvertent tug or aircraft 
movement occur resulting in a collision 
between the tug and. aircraft. 
9.3.4 Operations with Driver Operated Towbarless 
Pushback Tug. Despatcher in Communications 
with Aircrew from within Tug beside Driver 
using Hardwire Headset or Cordless 
Commun icat ions 
Ranked 4: 2 Person Operation 
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Advantages: 
a) Does not require any personnel to walk 
beside the aircraft during pushback. 
b) Removal of the need for manual connection 
of the tug to the aircraft and removal of 
the towbar as a possible agency of injury. 
c) Permits the Despatcher to remain in the 
pushback tug and in communication with, 
the Aircrew, without the need to walk 
under the aircraft except to disconnect 
the headset or communications transmitter 
from the aircraft. 
Disadvantages: 
a) High initial capital outlay on equipment. 
b) Despatcher remains exposed to injury 
should inadvertent aircraft movement occur 
while disconnecting communications from 
aircraft. 
c) Exposes Driver and Despatcher to injury 
should inadvertent tug or aircraft 
movement occur resulting in a collision 
between the tug and aircraft. 
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9.3.5 Operations with Conventional Pushback Tug and 
Towbar. Despatcher in Communication with 
Aircrew from within Tug beside Driver, using 
Hardwire Headset or Cordless Communications 
Ranked 5: 2 Person Operation 
Advantages: 
a) Does not require any personnel to walk 
beside the aircraft during pushback. 
b) Low initial capital outlay on equipment. 
Disadvantages: 
a) Despatcher remains exposed to injury 
should inadvertent aircraft or tug 
movement occur while connecting or 
disconnecting the towbar and the tug. 
b) Despatcher remains exposed to injury 
should inadvertent aircraft movement occur 
while disconnecting communications from 
aircraft. 
a) Exposes Driver and Despatcher to injury 
should inadvertent tug or aircraft 
movement occur resulting in a collision 
between the tug and aircraft. 
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9.4 Cost Benefit Considerations 
As suggested in Section 5.1.1, the significance of pushback 
accidents lay in their often high resultant severity of 
injury,.rather than in their frequency of occurrence. As 
Figure 7 indicated, in the period 1964 to 1992, on average 
the worldwide aviation industry experienced only 1 pushback 
accident every 1.59 years, although in the 4 years 1989 to 
1992, the mean annual rate increased to over 5 accidents per 
year. 
Even at that higher industry-wide rate of 5 accidents 
per annum, on average each of the 217 IATA 
member airlines (Cooper (1993)), could only expect to 
experience about one pushback accident every 43 years, 
assuming all airlines had equal exposure. 
This low "per airline" occurrence rate creates a dilemma, 
for the solution to the pushback problem lies in the 
individual airlines adopting the solutions suggested in the 
Recommendations in Section 9. 
Fortunately, while it is difficult to relate pushback 
accident frequency to potential health and safety cost 
savings at the single airline level, there are significant 
operational cost savings by adoption of the higher ranked 
solutions in Section 9.3. 
The following outlines a simple cost benefit calculation 
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regarding Recommendation 9.3.1 (Ranked 1) above. It assumes 
the existing pushback system utilizes a 3 person operation 
(Driver, Despatcher and 1 Assistant) and a MAN GHH AM150 
Towbarless Pushback Tug and 1 person operation is to be 
introduced (see Figure 15). Annual equipment operating cost 
savings and capital requirements were provided by MAN GHH 
(see Appendix No 16). The calculation model used below is a 
simplification ofthe Oxenburgh (1991) Productivity Model. 
AM150 Capital Cost: AUD $893100 
AM150 Annual Operating Cost Saving: AUD $ 50000 
Assumed Existing Salaries: 
Driver: 
Despatcher: 
Assistant: 
AUD $ 45000 
AUD $ 55000 
AUD $ 40000 
Assumed Salaries After Introduction: 
Driver: AUD $ 50000 
Pay-Back 
Period 
Capital Outlay 
Annual Estimated 
Savings 
Annual Estimated 
Savings 
Annual Salary
 + Annual Operating 
Savings Cost Savings " 
=> Pay-Back 
Period 
893100 
45000 +55000 + 40000 - 50000 + 50000 
r> Pay-Back 
Period 
6.38 years 
- 80 -
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
Causes and Prevention 
The following is a similar cost benefit calculation 
regarding Recommendation 9.3.2 (Ranked 2). It assumes the 
existing pushback system utilizes a 3 person operation 
(Driver, Despatcher and 1 Assistant) and a Powerpush 
Towbarless Pushback Tug and 1 person operation is to be 
introduced (see Figure 18). Annual equipment operating cost 
savings and capital requirements were cited in Powerpush Ltd 
(1993) . 
Powerpush Capital Cost: AUD $215000 
Powerpush Annual Operating Cost Saving: AUD $ 21675 
Assumed Existing Salaries: 
Driver: 
Despatcher: 
Assistant: 
AUD $ 45000 
AUD $ 55000 
AUD $ 40000 
Assumed Salaries After Introduction: 
Driver: AUD $ 50000 
Pay-Back 
Period 
Capital Outlay 
Annual Estimated 
Savings 
Annual Estimated 
Savings 
Annual Salary
 + Annual Operating 
Savings Cost Savings 
=> Pay-Back 
Period 
215000 
45000 +.55000 + 40000 - 50000 + 21675 
s> Pay-Back _ 
Period 
1.93 years 
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Since there is an apparent productivity cost benefit in 
application of the alternative pushback equipment and 
systems, particularly in relation to Recommendation 
9.3.2, it would be morally inappropriate not to 
adopt those technologies and gain the additional benefit of 
protecting pushback crew members from the risk of injury. 
Given the high productivity cost benefit, there should be no 
financial impediment to introduction of such new 
equipment and work practices. 
9.5 Probable Implementation Difficulties 
Implementation difficulties will1 arise out of personnel 
resistance to change. As the Despatcher interviews showed 
(see Section 5.2.2), there was a body of opinion that there 
was no need for change at all. This opinion was not 
surprising given the low pushback accident occurrence rate 
when the problem is viewed at the airline level. After all, 
it is from this perspective that airline employees will view 
the issue. 
In addition, as part of the strategies outlined in Section 
9.3 above involved the reduction of the number of people 
required to carry out the pushback task, there will be 
additional resistance from within the work force and 
industrial organisations who may attempt to prevent the 
reduction of the overall number of jobs. 
One method to minimise this resistance to change may be the 
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widespread circulation of suitable literature outlining the 
pushback accident problem, particularly including details of 
those accidents which have occurred. Such awareness 
literature will assist making this industry-wide problem, an 
internal airline issue. 
9.6 Recommendations for Further Work 
9.6.1 Accident Occurrence Frequency 
The lack of pushback data on an industry basis made 
comparison of accident rates of dubious value. There 
would be benefit in surveying a cross-section of the 
airlines to determine their numbers of pushbacks 
completed per annum for the past ten years. The 
result could be extrapolated to give an approximate 
industry performance and a more accurate indication of 
whether or not the annual pushback accident occurrence 
rate was increasing. 
9.6.2 Cordless Communications 
The need exists for continued development of aircraft 
compatible cordless communications. There are 
currently two problems which need to be overcome: 
. frequency congestion, and 
. system to aircraft interface anomalies. 
Once a satisfactory system is developed, operational 
trials would be required to assess the health and 
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safety impact, including any operations or procedure 
changes which would be required, for its safe 
introduction to line operations. 
Aircraft manufacturers should consider incorporating a 
suitable cordless cockpit to ground communication 
system within future aircraft design. This would 
obviate one feature of existing cordless systems, that 
of an external transceiver plugged into the aircraft 
ground interphone. Connection and disconnection of 
the external transceiver was two of the tasks which 
exposed ground crew members to risk of injury during 
pushback (see Section 9.3) and was the Only remaining 
significant health and safety risk associated with 
Recommendation Ranked 1 in Section 9.3.1 above. 
Removal of these tasks should result in additional 
direct improvements in safety of pushback operations. 
9.6.3 Depth and Scope of Pushback Accident investigations 
The wide range in depth and standard of accident 
investigations revealed in this study indicate a need 
for development of a set of detailed guidelines for 
investigation of such events. The guidelines should 
take into consideration the work of Reason (1991b) to 
ensure all operating and management systems and 
decisions are challenged in future pushback accident 
investigations. 
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9.6.4 Towbarless Pushback Tugs: Safety of Operators 
As stated previously, the Literature contained no 
discussion on the health and safety impacts of 
towbarless pushback tug use. Although the Safety 
Professionals in this study that had experience with 
towbarless pushback tugs strongly stressed'their 
health and safety benefits, it would be appropriate 
for detailed analysis to be conducted giving 
consideration to any inherent changes in exposure to 
injury or other health and safety risks their use 
provides. 
9.6.5 Narrow Body Aircraft: Involvement in Towbar or Tug 
Related Accidents 
This study revealed a predominance of narrow bodied ' 
aircraft involvement in accidents in which the 
pushback tug or towbar were the agency of injury. 
While adoption of towbarless pushback tugs should 
eliminate this injury mode (as recommended in Section 
9.3 above), since not all airlines will adopt 
towbarless equipment (as suggested in Section 9.5 
above), there would be benefit in the detailed study 
of the different operating techniques and procedures 
used by airlines for wide and narrow bodied aircraft 
pushbacks. An understanding of the reasons for towbar 
and pushback tug related accidents may assist with the 
accident prevention programs for those airlines. 
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Eagea 
Assistant/Observer 
This pushback crew member is often the 3rd person in a 3 person 
pushback crew. The Assistant Observer is usually required to 
walk beside the aircraft fuselage during pushback on the opposite 
side of the aircraft to the Despatcher. Figure 1 shows an 
Assistant/Observer (dressed in yellow) in that position. The 
duties of the Assistant/Observer often include, observation of 
engines on their side of the aircraft during engine start, 
helping to observe and warn of obstructions behind the aircraft, 
and disconnection of the towbar at completion of the pushout. 
Cordless Communication System 
A radio transmitter and receiver system intended to replace the 
hardwire cable headset for communication between aircraft aircrew 
and despatchers. Elements of a cordless communications system 
may include a transmitter receiver which plugs into the aircraft 
external ground interphone socket, a transmitter receiver which 
is worn on the belt of the pushback crew member or members, and a 
microphone headset worn by the crew member or members. 
Despatcher « 
The Despatcher is the leader of the pushback crew and the person 
usually in communication with the aircrew via the headset and 
lead. 
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Iniurv Aaencv 
Injury agency refers to the part of the pushback system hardware 
that was physically involved in injury causation. 
Light UP 
The segment of aircraft engine start where the engine commences 
self sustained ignition and does not rely on bleed air from other 
engines or external sources to sustain engine rotation. 
Narrow Body Aircraft 
Narrow body aircraft is the term normally used to refer to 
aircraft with single aisle passenger cabins. However, in the 
context of this paper, narrow body aircraft are considered to be 
those with fuselage bottom heights less than 183cm from the 
ground. 
N1 
Gas turbine engines have 2 or 3 sections called spools, which 
rotate independently. N, is the technical name given to the 1st 
stage or fan section of the engine. The second and third spools 
are referred to as N2 and N3 respectively. Early in the engine 
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start sequence, particularly when the aircraft is positioned tail 
into wind, it is possible for N, to be rotating backwards due to 
influence of the wind, while N2 (or N3 in a 3 speed engine) is 
rotating forwards due to the action of ,the starter bleed air. it 
is necessary for the aircrew to wait for forward N, rotation to • 
establish, before the fuel is turned on to the engine to permit 
self sustained ignition. 
Potentially Damaging Energy Space 
The area around the aircraft nosewheels, mainwheels or the 
pushback tug, in which a person may be exposed to the kinetic or 
potential energy inherent in the aircraft or tug. In the 
aviation industry it is commonly referred to as the nosewheel, 
mainwheel or pushback tug hazard zone or zones. It is the area 
in which airline procedures or pushback systems, attempt to 
ensure personnel do.not operate while the potentially damaging 
energy exists, particularly the kinetic energy associated with 
the moving aircraft and tug.* 
Pushback Accident 
Pushback accidents are unplanned events which occur during 
pushback which result in personnel injury or increased risk of 
injury or any damage to the aircraft or pushback equipment. 
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Pushback Driver 
Is the pushback crewmember whose task it is to operate the 
pushback tug during all phases of the pushback. The prime 
function of the pushback driver is to position the aircraft in a 
safe position for engine start and subsequent taxi. 
Pushout 
Pushout is the segment of the pushback where the aircraft is in 
motion backwards while being pushed away from the terminal by the 
pushback tug. 
Safety Professional 
In the context of this paper, Safety Professional means those 
persons in the various organisations responsible for development, 
promulgation and audit of airport operations safety policy. 
Towbarless Pushback Tug 
A vehicle used for pushing or towing aircraft which does not 
require a towbar to connect the vehicle to the aircraft. Some 
towbarless tug types envelope the aircraft nosewheel and others 
envelope the mainwheels. Aircraft movement is facilitated by 
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either picking up the nosewheel into the tug or trapping and 
directly rotating the aircraft wheels, dependent on tug type. 
Figures 15 to 18 depict some examples of towbarless pushback 
tugs. 
Wide Body Aircraft 
Wide body aircraft are normally considered to be those with more 
than 1 aisle in the passenger cabin. For the purpose of this 
paper, wide body aircraft are those with fuselage bottom heights 
over 183cm above ground level. 
Wing Walker 
The member of the pushback crew whose duties require them to walk 
near the aircraft wing tips during pushback to ensure wing tip 
clearance from obstructions. Wingwalkers are normally only used 
when obstructions or damage congestion is present or expected. 
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AIRLINE PUSHBACK PROCEDURE 
CAUTION; INTERPHONE SYSTEM MUST BE SERVICEABLE, HAND 
SIGNALS WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THIS 
MANOEUVRE. WHENEVER A REMARK IS MADE, AN 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OR REPLY MUST FOLLOW. WHENEVER A 
REMARK OR CLEARANCE IS MISUNDERSTOOD, THE TERM 
"SAY AGAIN" MUST BE USED. THE ONLY WORD TO BE 
USED BY COCKPIT OR GROUND, IF NOT READY, IS 
"STANDBY". 
Prior to the pushout operation, the Despatch Engineer 
(a) Ensure Aircraft documents on board. 
(b) Ensure nosewheel steering by-pass pin is correctly 
fitted. 
(c) Connect the towbar and towmotor by front or rear 
connection as appropriate. 
(d) ENSURE TWO CHOCKS ARE CARRIED ON THE TOWMOTOR FOR ALL 
AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS. 
The Despatch Engineer will give clearances during the 
despatch after ensuring the area is safe and clear in 
conformity with the following procedures. Standardised 
phraseology must be used by Flight Crew and Despatch 
Engineer: 
PILOT "Clear to Pressurise" (Hydraulics)-
DESP. ENG. — When it is clear to do so, reply 
"Clear to Pressurise", or '"Standby". 
PILOT "Brakes Parked, — clear to remove chocks". 
DESP. ENG — "Removing chocks". 
B727 AIRCRAFT: 
PILOT —;- "Clear to raise rear stairs". 
DESP. ENG — "When it is clear to do so, reply 
"Clear to raise rear stairs". 
Connect the tow bar and tow motor by front or rear towing 
connection as appropriate. 
CAUTION: ENSURE TWO CHOCKS ARE CARRIED ON THE TOW MOTOR 
FOR EMERGENCY NEED DURING PUSH-OUT. 
Prior to giving clearance for brakes release, ensure all 
locker doors and panels are secure and locked. Also 
ensure all obstructions and personnel are clear, 
aerobridge clear and forward passenger door locked. Turn 
limit marks for nosewheel steering must not be exceeded 
under any circumstances. 
PILOT "Ready for brakes release". 
DESP. ENG When it is clear, reply 
"Release Brakes" 
Engine starting may be carried out:-
(a) Prior to push-out. 
(b) During push-out. 
(c) On completion of push-out. 
The preferred time is during push-out, however, other 
circumstances inay require a different time and this will 
be adopted by mutual agreement between the Despatch 
Engineer and the Captain. 
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. 6 A start clearance will be given after the Despatch 
Engineer ascertains that all obstructions are clear of the 
aircraft. The Despatch Engineer and his assistant are 
the only persons permitted to approach the aircraft. if 
unauthorised persons approach the aircraft then the 
start/push-out will be discontinued. 
PILOT "Brakes released, push-back approved" 
DESP. ENG. When it is clear, reply 
"Pushing back, clear to start engines". 
.7 After the aircraft has been pushed to the required 
departure point and the tbwmotor has stopped. 
DESP. ENG "Park brakes". 
PILOT "Brakes parked". 
.8 After the Captain advises "Brakes parked". 
(a) Position a chock 4" - 6" ClC(o-l50mm) in front of 
nosewheels, 
(b) Disconnect the towbar from the push-back tug 
(c) Disconnect the towbar from the aircraft. 
(d) Remove the steering by-pass pin. 
A300 AIRCRAFT. Ensure.that the bypass lever returns 
.fully to the normal position. 
.9 The Despatch Engineer will remain on the intercom until 
bLL the towing equipment has been moved clear of the 
aircraft. 
DESP. ENG "Equipment clear". 
PILOT "Clear to disconnect". 
DESP. ENG "Disconnecting". 
The Despatch Engineer will disconnect the intercom and 
close the intercom panel/door. The Assistant Despatch 
Engineer will remove the nosewheel. chock. Both Engineers 
«i £ _ * „ « . a P° x n ^ remaining in full view of the Captain 
aiZtlfl 0 f f i c e r (approximately 50ft - 16 metres) from the' 
aircraft nose. 
•S-«»2 ^t °" ° f ^lmh3 UP" signal from Flight Crew the 
Despatch Engineer will acknowledge with "Thumbs up" signal 
indicating "all clear to taxi" ensuring a positive 
sighting of the steering disconnect pin. 
MQT£: Initiation of the "Thumbs up" will be given by the 
Crew member on the same side of the aircraft as the 
Despatch Engineer. 
The Despatch Engineer and his assistant will move clear 
and return to the office/building area, after observing 
r.ne aircraft has commenced to taxi. 
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The following summaries are based on the existing information 
available in the sources mentioned. Accident circumstances, 
causes and preventive action, where mentioned in the 
texts, are extracted directly from those sources. 
Causal factors included in bold typeface at the end of 
each summary are interpretations of the writer. They are the 
basis for causal factor analysis in Section 5 of this report. 
Accident 1 
Date: 23/09/64 
Aircraft Type: DC8 
Location: San Juan, Puerto Rico 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1993) 
Horn (1993 interview) 
During the pushback from the terminal, the despatcher 
on the headset was trapped by the aircraft nosewheel. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Person out of Position 
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Accident 2 
Date: 19/04/71 
...•:. Aircraft Type: B747 
Location: Copenhagen, Denmark 
Person Injured: Assistant/Observer 
Injury Extent: Non-fatal: Details Unknown 
Injury Agency: Pushback Tug 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
While the towbar was being connected prior to 
pushback, the ground crew member's foot was trapped 
between the end of the towbar and the clevis on the 
pushback tractor. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Trapped by Towbar 
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Accident 3 
Date: 19/12/71 
Aircraft Type: B747 
Location: Milan, Italy 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-fatal: Serious leg injury 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
The aircraft rolled forward during engine start after 
push out from the terminal. The nosewheel rolled over 
the despatcher's leg. The tarmac sloped 2% downward 
and no wheel chocks were used. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
Person out of Position 
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Accident 4 
Date: 1972 
Aircraft Type: DC8 
Location: Philadelphia, USA 
Person Injured: Wihg Walker 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal:Leg Amputation 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Horn (1993 interview) 
During the pushback a wing Walker was not paying 
attention to his position relative to the aircraft. 
The nose wheels of the aircraft ran over the 
wingwalkers legs. 
Both the wing walker and the tractor driver were at 
fault. 
Causal Factors: 
Inattention to Task 
Fault of Personnel 
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Accident 5 
Date: 15/05/73 
Aircraft Type: B747 
Location: . Lisbon, Portugal 
Person injured: Despatcher 
Inj ury Extent: Non-Fatal: Foot Inj ury 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
When the towbar was disconnected after the aircraft 
was pushed out from the terminal, the aircraft rolled 
forward and the nosewheel trapped the foot of the 
despatcher on the headset from behind. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
Person out of Position 
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Accident 6 
Date: 08/10/73 
Aircraft Type: DC8 
Location: Tokyo, Japan 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
The despatcher was run over by the aircraft nose wheel 
during pushback from the terminal. 
No further details were available 
Causal Factors: 
Not Known 
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Accident 7 
Date: 
Aircraft Type: 
Location: 
Person Injured: 
Injury Extent: 
Injury Agency: 
Sources: 
After the pushout from the terminal and the aircraft 
was being towed forward to an engine start area, the 
despatcher fell from the towbar and was run over by 
the aircraft nose wheels. The accident occurred at 
night 
No further information was available. 
. Causal Factors: 
Person Stumbled, Tripped or Fell 
Failure to Follow Procedure 
Jumped Towbar 
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DC8 
New York, USA 
Despatcher 
Fatal 
Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
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Accident 8 
Date: 24/10/75 
Aircraft Type: B707 
Location: Sydney, Australia 
Person Injured: Pushback Tug Driver 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Pushback Tug 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Kemmis (1993 interview) 
After the tug was disconnected at the completion of 
the push out from the terminal, the tug moved forward 
and impacted the nose of the aircraft. The driver was 
crushed between the tug and the aircraft. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Inadvertent Tug Movement 
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Causes and Prevention 
APPENDIX NO.2 Page 9 
Accident 9 
Date: 19/12/75 
Aircraft Type: B747 
Location: Montreal, Canada 
Person Injured: Assistant/Observer 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Pushback Tug 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
During the process of connecting the towbar to the 
tug, the tug drivers foot slipped off the brake pedal 
and the tug moved forward. The ground crew member 
positioning the towbar was crushed by the tug. 
Causal Factors: 
Inadvertent Tug Movement 
:fi 
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Date: 13/08/77 
Aircraft Type: B747 
Location: Honolulu, USA 
Person Injured: Assistant/Observer 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels and Main Wheels 
Sources: .Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Simpson (1993 Interview) 
After pushout from the gate and aircraft was being 
towed forward to an engine start area, a ground crew 
member fell from the tug and was run over by the nose 
wheels and the fuselage main gear wheels. The 
despatcher on the headset also fell from the tug while 
attempting to catch the assistant, however, the 
despatcher was not run over by the aircraft. The 
accident occurred during darkness. 
The tug had been connected to the aircraft with the 
driver's cabin facing away from the aircraft. 
Accordingly, the driver was unaware that the crew 
members had fallen from the tug as they were outside 
his field of view. 
Causal Factors: 
Person stumbled, Tripped or Fell 
Fell from Tug 
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Accident 11 
Date: 28/03/78 
Aircraft Type: A300 
Location: Miami, USA 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
The despatcher was runover by the aircraft nosewheel 
during pushback. 
No further details were available. 
Causal Factors: 
Not Known 
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Accident 12 
Date: 06/11/78 
Aircraft Type: L1011 
Location: Atlanta, USA 
Person Injured: Wing Walker 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Main Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
During pushback the wing walker on the left wing was 
runover by the left main gear wheels. Weather was not 
a factor and engines were not started. 
No further details were'available. 
Causal Factors: 
Not Known 
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Accident 13 
Date: 28/04/79 
Aircraft Type: A300 
Location: Dusseldorf, Germany 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Schmid and Chorz (1979) 
Schmid (1993 interview) 
During a right turn in the pushback after the start 
of the No.2 engine, the despatcher on the headset, who 
was on the starboard side of the aircraft, walked 
into the path of the aircraft nose wheels while 
attempting to observe the start of the No.l engine. 
. Four seconds after the start of No.l engine, the 
despatcher's foot was caught by the starboard nose 
wheel. He fell to the ground and the nose wheel ran 
up his body to the hip. 
At the time of the accident, the airline's procedures 
required the despatcher to advise the aircrew "NI 
turning" and "Light Up" at the appropriate stages of 
engine start. To comply with this requirement the 
despatcher had to move close to the aircraft 
centreline during the pushback to observe the engine 
on the opposite side of the aircraft to himself. 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
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The double reponsibility of leading the pushback and 
also monitoring engine start lead to this accident" 
Schmid and Chorz (1979). 
As a result of this accident, the following 
changes to pushback procedures were developed by the 
airline: 
. The requirement for the despatcher to advise "Ni 
turning" and "Light Up" to the aircrew was removed. 
.The despatcher was required to remain in the full 
view of the aircrew while the aircraft and tug were 
in motion, at least 3 metres from the nose wheels. 
. Equipment was modified to include communications 
interphone connections on the front and rear of all 
pushback tugs and tdwbars had retractable 
communications leads installed. This permitted the 
despatcher to be positioned 5 metres behind the rear 
of the tug while the aircraft and tug were in 
motion. In this way the despatcher was placed well 
outside the pushback hazard zone of the aircraft 
nosewheel and tug but in a position to observe all 
aspects of the pushback. 
Consideration was also given to putting elevated 
platforms on the front and back of pushback tugs 
for despatchers to stand on. 
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Causal Factors: 
Person out of Position 
Distraction by Engine Observation Requirements 
Person Required to walk Beside Aircraft Nose 
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Accident 14 
Date: 06/08/79 
Aircraft Type: DC8 
Location: Miami, USA . 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
While the aircraft was under tow from one gate to 
another the despatcher fell over and was run over by 
the aircraft nose wheels. 
No further information were available. 
Causal Factors: 
Person Stumbled, Tripped, or Fell 
£age_ie 
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Accident 15 
Date: 30/11/79 
Aircraft Type: Unknown 
Location: Unknown 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1993) 
During pushback the despatcher was walking close to 
the nose wheels on the starboard side of the aircraft. 
The No.2 engine was already running and No. 1 was 
being started. The despatcher walked to the center 
line of the airplane, in the path of the nose wheels, 
to better observe the light up of the engine. The 
nose wheel caught the left foot of the despatcher 
causing him to fall and be run over by the nose wheel. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Distraction by Engine Observation Requirements 
Person out of Position 
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Accident 16 
Date: 
Aircraft Type: 
Location: 
Person Injured: 
. Injury Extent: 
Injury Agency: 
Sources: 
While walking beside the nose wheels during pushback, 
the despatcher's attention was distracted by a truck 
crossing behind the airplane. At that time the driver 
commenced a turn and the nose wheels ran over both of 
the despatcher's legs causing serious injury. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Distraction by Extraneous Factors 
29/12/80 
DC10 
Newark, USA 
Despatcher 
Non-Fatal: Leg Amputation 
Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
Causes and Prevention 
APPENDIX NO.2 Page 19 
Accident 17 
Date: 20/05/81 
Aircraft Type: DC10 
Location: Miami, USA 
Person Injured: Despatcher -
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Simpson (1993 Interview) 
During the pushback the despatcher was walking near 
the aircraft nose wheels when his right leg was 
trapped and run over. 
Both the tug driver and the despatcher were distracted 
by an engine compressor stall during engine start of 
an aircraft on the adjacent parking bay. 
When the driver looked back toward the nose wheel he 
could not see the despatcher. Before the aircraft was 
brought to a halt, the nose wheels had run up the body 
of the despatcher. 
Causal Factors: 
Person out of Position 
Distraction by Extraneous Factors 
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Accident 18 
Date: 24/01/82 
Aircraft Type: A300 
Location: Casablanca, Morocco 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Left Leg Amputation, broken 
right leg 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Air France (1982) 
Hogwood (1992) 
After completion of the pushout from the terminal, 
while the aircraft was being towed forward at normal 
speed, engine start was commenced. While attempting 
to see the No.l engine rotation, the despatcher walked 
into the path of the aircraft nose wheels. The nose 
wheels caught the despatcher's left leg and the 
despatcher fell and rolled over to avoid being fully 
run over by the aircraft. 
When -the tug driver saw the nose wheels hit the 
despatcher he suddenly applied the brakes. However, 
the towbar shear pin sheared and the aircraft 
continued to roll forward several metres. 
This accident was due to the inattention of the 
mechanic and his non authorised position between the' 
• nose wheels of the aircraft and the tug", Air France 
(1982). 
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"If the mechanics follow the procedures and they keep 
in touch with the cockpit and out of the path of the 
path of the aircraft and tug, there should be no 
problem", Air France (1982). 
After this accident the airline changed procedures to 
remove the requirement for despatchers to observe and 
advise aircrew of engine NI rotation. "This measure 
reduces the risk taken by the mechanic to get near 
the towbar and the aeroplane to notice NI rotation" 
Air France (1982). 
Causal Factors: 
Person out of Position 
Inattention to Task 
Distraction by Engine Observation Requirements 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
Causes and Prevention 
APPENDIX NO.2 £S3§ 
Accident 19 
Date: 07/09/83 
Aircraft Type: B747 
Location: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
r 
Person Injured: Despatcher -
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Foot Amputation 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
During a turn in the.pushback the despatcher's heel 
was trapped by the nose wheel and his foot was run 
over. The headset cord was reported to be short 
although the actual length was not known. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Person out of Position 
Short Headset Cord 
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Accident 20 
Date: 1984 
Aircraft Type: DC10 
Location: Den Pasar 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Hogwood (1992) 
Hogwood (1993 Interview) 
The despatcher was run over by the aircraft 
nosewheels during the pushback. The headset cable 
became entangled in the nosewheel and the despatcher 
was unable to break free before being run over. 
The accident occurred toward the end of the 
despatcher's extended night shift. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Headset cord Tangled/Trapped 
Extended Duty Period 
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Date: 18/04/85 
Aircraft Type: B767 
Location: Tel Aviv, Israel 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Sherman (1993 Interview) 
After completion of the pushout, while the aircraft 
was being towed forward to the engine.start area, the 
despatcher's head set lead became entangled in the 
nose wheel. This resulted in the despatcher being 
pulled under the nose gear wheels and fully run over. 
The tug had been connected with the driver's cab 
facing away from the aircraft. While this improved 
the driver's forward vision during the tow, it placed 
the despatcher completely outside the driver's field 
of vision. As such the driver was unaware the 
despatcher had been pulled under the aircraft 
nosegear. 
As a result.of this accident, the airline changed 
procedures to require the aircraft to always 
be connected to the driver's cab end of the tug. This 
was intended to ensure the driver could keep the 
despatcher in view at all times. Drivers were then 
4-1992: 
Page 7t 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
Causes and Prevention 
APPENDIX NO.2 Pace 25 
required to initiate a stop if the despatcher moved 
out of the driver's line of sight. 
Causal Factors: 
Headset cord Tangled/Trapped 
Towbar Connected to Wrong End of Tug 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
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Accident 22 
Date: 06/11/85 
Aircraft Type: B747 
Location: Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Severe Foot Injury 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
van Ess (1993) 
Legdeur (1993 Interview) 
During a turn in the pushback, the despatcher was 
observing smoke emanating from the No,2 engine when 
the aircraft nose wheel caught his overall pants 
leg. The despatcher was unable to pull free and was . 
knocked down. The aircraft nosewheels ran over both of 
the despatcher's feet. 
The head set lead used by the despatcher was 
approximately 3 metres long. 
As a result of this accident, the airline amended 
procedures to remove the requirement for despatchers 
to walk beside the aircraft during pushback. Pushback 
tugs were modified to include communications and 
better visibility from the cabin. Thereafter, the 
despatcher was required to ride inside the tug beside 
the driver. Engine start does not take place 
until movement of the aircraft has been completed 
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when the despatcher may come out of the tug to 
monitor the start. 
Causal Factors: 
Distraction by Engine Observation Requirements 
Person out of Position 
Person Required to Walk Beside Aircraft Nose 
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Accident 23 
Date: 01/11/85 
Aircraft Type: L1011 
Location: London, England 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Foot Injury 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
During pushout from the terminal, the nose wheel ran 
over the despatcher's foot. 
No further details were available. 
Causal Factors: 
Not Known 
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Accident 24 
Date: 10/11/87 
Aircraft Type: B737 
Location: Melbourne, Australia 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Severe Shock 
Injury Agency: Aircraft 
Sources: Jenkins (1987) 
Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, 
Australia (1988) 
After the pushout was completed, the towbar had been 
disconnected, the tug had moved away and engine start 
completed, the aircraft began to taxi with the 
despatcher still connected to the aircraft by the 
headset and lead. While trying to keep up with the 
aircraft, the despatcher attempted to alert 
the aircrew but was unsuccessful because they had 
already made radio receiver selections which 
precluded ground interphone reception. However, the 
event was observed from the control tower and the 
controller advised the aircrew to stop the aircraft. 
The despatcher was not physically injured. 
Investigation confirmed that the aircrew had failed 
to follow normal aircraft despatch procedures. 
Weather and conditions at the time were not 
considered factors in the occurrence. 
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Causal Factors: 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
Poor Communications 
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Accident 25 
Date: 05/03/88 
Aircraft Type: B737 
Location: Tulsa, USA 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Foot Injury 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Douglass (1993 Interview) 
On the night of the accident the normal pushback crew 
were occupied with the pushback of another aircraft 
which would normally have already departed. The 
airline's agent who had some previous experience with 
pushbacks offered to assist by carrying out the 
despatcher's duties to minimise any delay. 
The agent's offer was accepted and the pushback 
proceeded normally until after the push out from the 
gate. The towbar was then disconnected and the tug 
returned to the tarmac. 
However, the.despatcher had failed to instruct the 
aircrew to set the aircraft park brake prior to 
disconnecting the towbar and he had also disconnected 
the headset prematurely from the aircraft. 
During the engine start the aircraft rolled forward 
until the nose wheel rolled onto the despatcher's 
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foot. The aircrew felt the aircraft roll forward and 
set the park brake with the nose wheel still on the 
despatcher's foot. 
As the despatcher had already disconnected the 
headset he was unable to alert the aircrew. The 
aircraft nosewheel remained on the despatcher's foot 
until the tug driver returned from the terminal, 
re-connected the tug and headset and pushed the 
aircraft off the despatcher. 
Causal Factors: 
Lack of Experience 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
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Accident 26 * 
Date: 12/07/89 
Aircraft Type: A300 
Location: San Juan, Puerto Rico 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Flynn (1993) 
During the pushback the despatcher walked under the 
fuselage directly in the path of the nosewheels, 
contrary to the laid down procedures of the airline 
involved. While under the fuselage the despatcher 
tripped and fell. At the time the tug driver was 
watching a wing walker to ensure that there was 
sufficient wing tip clearance from an obstruction on 
an adjacent bay. The driver did not see the 
despatcher fall but when he looked back from the 
wingwalker, the despatcher was not in sight and the 
driver immediately stopped the pushback. 
However, the despatcher had already been run over by 
the aircraft nosewheels and fatally injured. 
The investigation was unable to determine why the 
despatcher walked beneath the aircraft fuselage. 
As a result of this accident, the airline amended 
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procedures to remove the requirement for the 
despatcher to walk beside the aircraft. 
Responsibility for communications with the aircrew was 
transferred to the tug driver by simply utlizing 
headsets with sufficient lead length to reach from the 
aircraft into the tug. 
Causal Factors: 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
Person Stumbled, Tripped or Fell 
Distraction by Extraneous Factors 
Person Required to Walk Beside Aircraft Nose 
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26/08/89 
B767 
Chicago, USA 
Despatcher 
Non-Fatal: Leg Amputation 
Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Busk (1993 Interview) 
The aircraft was being moved to another parking bay 
and during the pushback the despatcher's leg was run 
over by the aircraft nose wheel. The despatcher was 
on the port side of the aircraft and knelt down to 
look under the fuselage to ensure the aircraft was 
clear of an obstruction adjacent to the starboard 
wing. 
While the despatcher was looking under the fuselage, 
the tug driver commenced to turn the aircraft tail to 
the left. This swung the nose of the aircraft toward 
the despatcher and the nose wheels ran over the 
despatcher's leg. 
The driver's attention had also been focused on the 
wing walker on the starboard wing. 
Causal Factors: 
Distraction by Extraneous Factors 
APPENDIX NO.2 
Accident 27 
Date: 
Aircraft.Type: 
Location: 
Person Injured: 
Injury Extent: 
Injury Agency: 
Sources: 
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Accident 28 * 
Date: 06/11/89 
Aircraft Type: B757 
Location: Phoenix, USA 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Leg Amputation 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: . Dial (1993) 
v Hogwood (1992) 
During pushback the despatcher's right heal was caught 
by the nose wheel and his leg was run over. 
t 
* • . ' • ' 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Trapped/Tripped by Nose Wheel 
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Accident 29 
Date: 15/01/90 
Aircraft Type: DC10 
Location: Memphis, USA 
Person Injured: Despatcher . -
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Leg Amputation 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Centre Main Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Brown (1993 Interview) 
After pushout and while towing the aircraft for 
repositioning to another bay, with the despatcher and 
an observer riding on the back of the tug, the headset 
lead became tangled in the aircraft nosewheels. The 
despatcher was pulled off the tug onto the ground. 
The aircraft nosewheels missed the despatcher but he 
was run over by the centre main wheels. 
The pushback tug was connected to the aircraft with 
the driver's cabin facing away from the aircraft. 
Accordingly, the driver was unaware that the 
despatcher had been pulled off the tug until the 
observer ran forward and signalled him to stop. 
There was the facility in the tug for the driver to 
communicate with the despatcher but this was not in 
use at the time of the accident. The despatcher and 
observer were riding on a part of the tug not 
approved for carriage of personnel. 
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Causal Factors: 
Headset Cord Tangled/Trapped 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
Fell from Tug 
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Accident 30 ' 
Date: 30/01/90 
Aircraft Type: B727 
Location: Indianapolis, USA 
Person Injured: Pushback Driver 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Pushback Tug 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Brown (1993 Interview) 
While attempting to connect the tug and towbar to the 
aircraft, the driver's foot became caught under the 
brake pedal and inadvertently pushed the accelerator. 
The tug surged forward and impacted the nose of the 
aircraft. The driver was crushed between the tug seat 
frame structure and the aircraft. 
The driver had been employed by the airline for only 
30 days, although he had over 8 years previous 
experience with another airline. 
The single handed method attempted by the driver to 
hook up the tug and towbar to the aircraft was not 
approved by the airline involved. 
Causal Factors: 
Inadvertent Tug Movement 
Lack of Experience 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
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Accident 31 
Date: 04/03/90 
Aircraft Type: B767 
Location: Melbourne, Australia 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Leg Amputation 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Ojczyk (1990) 
During the pushback the despatcher was walking about 1 
metre away from, and slightly ahead of the nose 
wheels. As the tug driver commenced a turn and the. 
nose of the aircraft swung toward the despatcher, the 
aircraft nosewheel struck the despatcher's foot 
causing him to stumble and fall into the path of the 
nose wheels. The nose wheels ran over the 
despatcher's left leg. 
At the time of the accident weather was fine and 
daylight visibility unlimited. 
The despatcher had previously been trained in 
accordance with the airline's requirements with 
regard to pushback operations and existing 
procedures were considered adequate, "push-out 
procedures adequately warn employees of the hazards 
associated with pushbacks and give a safe position 
for the Dispatch Engineer during push-outs", Ojczyk 
X
^ ^ ^'7 
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(1990). 
As a result of this accident the airline involved 
gave consideration to use of cordless communications 
systems. 
Causal Factors: 
Person Stumbled, Tripped or Fell 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
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Accident 32 
Date: 19/04/90 
Aircraft Type: B757 
Location: Manila, Philippines 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1993) 
During a sharp turn in the pushback the despatcher was 
run over by the nose wheel. The despatcher had been 
working for the airline for 3-4 years. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Not Known 
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accident 33 
Date: 07/06/90 
Aircraft Type: B757 
Location: Glasgow, Scotland 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Leg Amputation 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
During a turn in the pushback, one of the nose wheels 
trapped the despacter's foot. The despatcher fell in 
the path of the nose wheels and his leg was run over. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Trapped/Tripped by Nose Wheel 
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Accident 34 
Date: 30/06/90 
Aircraft Type: DC9 
Location: Atlanta, USA 
Person Injured: Assistant/Observer 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Minor Injuries 
Injury Agency: Pushback Tug 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
While connecting the towbar to the tug, the tug 
lurched forward and struck two members of the ground 
crew. One crew member received minor facial cuts and 
the second sustained a sprained.ankle. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Inadvertent Tug Movement 
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Accident 35 
Date: 05/07/90 
Aircraft Type: DC8 
Location: Madrid, Spain 
Person Injured: Assistant/Observer 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Towbar 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
After the towbar was connected and before the aircraft 
brakes were released for pushback, the tug lurched. 
The aircraft did not move but the towbar buckled and 
broke. Fragments from the towbar struck and inflicted 
fatal injuries to a ground crew member. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Inadvertent Tug Movement 
Equipment Failure 
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Accident 36 
Date: 26/10/90 
Aircraft Type: BAel46 
Location: Christchurch, New Zealand 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Broken arm, collar bone and 
ribs, and hip laceration 
Injury Agency: Pushback Tug 
Sources: Hogwood (1992) 
French (1990) 
During a turn in the pushback, the despatcher on the 
headset attempted to step over the towbar but tripped 
and fell. The driver initiated an emergency stop, 
however before the tug was brought to a halt, the 
despatcher became wedged under the front of the 
pushback tug. 
The despatcher had attempted to cross over the towbar 
in order to observe the engine start of the two 
engines on the opposite side of the aircraft. These 
engines were not visible during the turn from his 
normal position. 
"1. Whenever possible all pushbacks are to be in a 
• straight line back from the originating gate. 2. The 
headset engineer is to be positioned to the left of 
the tow tug behind the forward wheels. The towbar 
may not be crossed unless the towbar is stationary" 
French (1990). 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
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Causal Factors: 
Jumped Towbar 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
Distraction by Engine Observation Requirements 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
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Accident 37 
Date: 1990 
Aircraft Type: DC9 
Location: Los Angeles, USA 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Broken Leg 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Hogwood (1993 Interview) 
During the pushback the despatcher's legs became 
entangled in the headset lead and the despatcher 
fell into the path of the nose wheels. The driver 
applied the brakes when the despatcher fell over but 
the aircraft came to rest with the nose wheels on top 
of the despatcher's leg. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Headset Cord Tangled/Trapped 
Person Stumbled, Tripped or Fell 
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Accident 38 
Date: 30/04/91 
Aircraft Type: B737 
Location: Madras, India 
Person Injured: Pushback "Driver 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Pushback Tug 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
The tug was in position in front of the aircraft but 
the towbar had not been connected when the tug 
inadvertently moved forward and impacted the nose of 
the aircraft. The driver was crushed between the tug 
and the aircraft. 
No further information was available. 
Causal Factors: 
Inadvertent Tug Movement 
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Accident 39 
Date: 10/06/91 
Aircraft Type: A300 
Location: Madinah, Saudi Arabia 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Fatal 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Hogwood (1992) 
Berenji et al (1991) 
The aircraft was parked on a stand-off bay with a 
ground power unit positioned in front of the 
aircraft nose. The despatcher was communicating 
with the aircrew and engine start was normal. 
However, without warning the aircraft began to move 
under its own power before the ground power unit 
was removed and without the despatcher giving 
the aircrew the "all clear" signal. 
When the aircraft.began to move the despatcher was 
mfront of the nosewheels having just removed the nose 
wheel chock. The despatcher had the headset resting 
around his neck with the earmuffs under his chin. 
Part of the headset cord was wrapped around his right 
arm and shoulder. As the aircraft started to move the 
despatcher pulled on the headset cord to jerk it out 
of the aircraft socket. However, when the cord fell 
to the ground it was trapped by the nosewheel. The 
despatcher then used both hands to try to pull free, 
the headset lead snapped and the despatcher over 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
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balanced backwards directly in front of the nose 
wheels. 
The aircraft nose wheels rolled up the full length 
of the despatcher's body. 
Neither the pilot nor the despatcher had followed the 
laid down procedures of the airline involved. Some 
language and communications problems also occurred 
between the aircrew and the despatcher. 
As a result of this accident the airline 
changed its procedures to "clearly state that 
personnel must avoid entanglements with cords that 
may restrict their freedom of movement around the 
aircraft" Berenji et al (1991). Also, pilots were 
reminded of their responsibilities to ensure all-
equipment and personnel were clear prior to aircraft 
movement. 
Causal Factors: 
Poor Communications 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
Headset Cord Tangled/Trapped 
Person Stumbled, Tripped or Fell 
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Accident 40 
Date: 16/11/91 
Aircraft Type: B737 
Location: Albuquerque, USA 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Leg Amputation 
Injury Agency: Pushback Tug 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1992) 
Carroll (1991) 
Douglass (1993 Interview) 
While the aircraft was being pushed back to the engine 
start position with the despatcher walking beside the 
tug, a turn was commenced and the left front wheel of 
the tug trapped the despatcher's foot and knocked him 
down. The tug wheel then ran over the despatcher's 
legs, crushing and severing the right leg below the 
knee and breaking the left ankle. 
The despatcher's "lack of attention to the changing 
position of the aircraft and push tug, and being 
close to the push tug caused this accident", Carroll 
(1991). 
As a result of this accident the airline involved 
amended procedures to prohibit the despatcher from 
the area around the aircraft nosewheels, towbar and 
pushback tug. Despatchers must maintain a minimum of 
3 metres separation from these areas when the 
. Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
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pushback is in motion. Headsets were modified to 
include a minimum of 5 metres cord length. 
Causal Factors: 
Inattention to Task 
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Accident 41 
Date: 19/12/91 
Aircraft Type: MD80 
Location: Copenhagen, Denmark 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Broken Leg 
Injury Agency: Pushback Tug 
Sources: Hogwood (1992) 
Busk and Laye (1992) 
While connecting the towbar to the pushback tug, the 
despatcher's leg was knocked by the towbar when the 
towbar slipped on the tug clevis. The despatcher fell 
to the ground and the driver, concerned he would run 
over the despatcher, turned the tug away from the 
despatcher but did hot apply the brakes. This action 
pushed the towbar further out to the opposite side 
across the despatcher's leg. 
No defects were found in the tug or towbar. The 
driver had completed two other pushbacks in quick 
succession and haste may have been a contributing 
factor to his failure to apply the brakes. 
Personnel involved were appropriately qualified for . 
the task in accordance with existing rules. 
The investigation found there was a need for "Better 
co-ordination between drivers and their central 
controllers to avoid stress situation", Busk and Laye 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
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(1992). 
Causal Factors: 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
Haste 
Trapped by Towbar 
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Accident 42 
Date: 21/03/92 
Aircraft Type: B757 
Location: Phoenix, USA 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Leg Amputation 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nose Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1993) 
The pushback was commenced with the despatcher walking 
beside the nose on the starboard side of the aircraft. 
After approximately 50 metres, the despatcher walked 
closer to the aircraft fuselage to gain a better view 
behind the aircraft. The nose wheel trapped the 
despatcher's right heel and caused him to fall to the 
ground. The nose wheel ran over the despatcher's 
right lower leg. 
At the time of the accident the tug driver was 
watching the aircraft wingtip in preparation for 
starting a turn. 
The aircraft was stopped and pulled forward to release 
the despatcher from under the nosewheel. 
Causal Factors: 
Trapped/Tripped by Nose Wheel 
Distraction by Extraneous Factors 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992 
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Accident 43 
Date: 27/03/92 
Aircraft Type: B757 
Location: Hayden, USA 
Person Injured: Despatcher 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Serious Right Leg Injuries 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Nosewheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1993) 
Vogt (1993) 
Flynn (1992) 
During the pushback the tug driver observed the 
despatcher walk under the fuselage in the path of the 
aircraft nose wheel. The driver did not stop the 
pushback because he thought the despatcher was clear 
of the aircraft. Shortly after, when the driver 
commenced a turn in the pushback, the nose wheel 
~contacted the despatcher's right leg and the 
despatcher fell to the ground. Although the driver 
attempted to stop the pushback, the despatcher was 
dragged 4 metres before the aircraft stopped. 
The company involved normally conducted pushbacks with 
the pushback driver in communication with the aircraft 
cockpit and no despatcher on the headset walking 
beside the aircraft. However, the pushback tug used 
did not have a communications adaptor for this 
purpose, nor was a aircaft communications lead of 
sufficient length available. 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
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There was no company procedures laid down for the 
operations with a despatcher on a head set plugged 
directly into the aircraft, nor were staff trained 
in this manner of operation. 
"Pushback procedures that require ground personnel to 
be close to the nose gear and directly connected to 
the communications panel in the nosegear well are 
unnecessary and unsafe. Procedures should be designed 
to provide the maximum protection to ground service 
personnel during potentially hazardous pushback 
operations" Vogt (1993). 
Causal Factors: 
Failure to follow Procedures 
Short Headset Cord 
Person out of Position 
Lack of Training 
Person Required to Walk Beside Aircraft Nose 
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Accident 44 
Date: 06/11/92 
Aircraft Type: B747 
Location: Bombay, India 
Person Injured: Assistant/Observer 
Injury Extent: Non-Fatal: Leg Amputation 
Injury Agency: Aircraft Main Wheels 
Sources: Dial (1993) 
As the aircraft was being pulled onto the parking bay, 
a ground crew member earring two wheel chocks walked 
aft alongside the aircraft fuselage. Before the 
aircraft came to a halt, the crew member stumbled and 
fell down in the path of the right main wheels, which 
ran over and crushed his leg. 
The parking bay.surface was reported to be uneven with 
bitumen patches. 
Causal Factors: 
Failure to Follow procedures 
Person Stumbled, Tripped or Fell 
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Accident 45 
Date: 
Aircraft Type: 
Location: 
Person Injured: 
Injury Extent: 
Injury Agency: 
Sources: 
Prior to commencement of the pushback, the two 
wingwalkers were standing under the aircraft fuselage 
near the main landing gear, to take advantage of the 
warm air emanating from the aircraft's air 
conditioning pack vents. After the despatcher gave the 
signal to the wingwalkers that they were about to 
start the pushback, he waited until the wingwalker on 
his side of the aircraft had walked clear and then 
gave the driver the signal to commence the pushback. 
The aircraft moved about 1 metre when the inboard tyre 
of the right main landing gear ran over the right leg 
of the second wingwalker. When subsequently 
interviewed the wingwalker was uncertain whether he 
had started to walk toward the wingtip, or was 
standing still when struck by the aircraft. 
All persons involved in the accident had received all 
necessary training. 
13/11/92 
B757 
Atlanta, USA 
Wingwalker 
Non-Fatal: Leg Amputation 
Aircraft Main Wheels 
Dial (1993) 
Godwin et al (1992) 
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"Had proper procedures been followed, this accident 
would not have happened", Godwin et al (1992). 
As a result of this accident, the airline involved 
changed procedures: "the dispatching ramp agent. 
ensures that all personnel and equipment are clear of 
the aircraft and ensures that wingwalkers are in 
place at each wing tip prior to removing the nose 
wheel chock", Godwin et al (1992). 
Causal Factors: 
Failure to follow Procedures 
Poor Weather 
Inattention to Task 
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Accident 46 
Date: 
Aircraft Type: 
Location: 
Person Injured: 
Injury Extent: 
Injury Agency: 
Sources: 
During the pushback the despatcher crossed over the 
towbar and tripped. He was run over by the pushback 
tug. The driver's attention had been concentrated on 
the aircraft wingtips at the time of the accident. 
The investigation could not determine the reason the 
despatcher attempted to cross the towbar. 
The accident occurred in daylight and weather was not 
a factor. 
Causal Factors: 
Failure to Follow Procedures 
Jumped Towbar 
08/12/92 
B737 
La Guardia, USA 
Despatcher 
Fatal 
Pushback Tug 
Dial (1993) 
Hogwood (1993) 
Simpson (1993 Interview) 
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Appendix No. 4 
ON-LINE DATABASE SEARCH 
An on-line search was conducted through the Barker Library using 
Dialog and Dialindex. The following lists the databases searched 
and keywords used: 
Databases Searched: 
Science and Technology: 
National Technical 
• • 
Information Service 
Compendex Pius 
Tris (Transportation 
Research Index) 
Aerospace Database 
Social Science: 
Dissertation Abstracts 
Online 
General: 
Jane's Defense & Aerospace 
News/Analysis 
PTS Aerospace/Defense 
Markets & Technology 
Keywords Used 
Aircraft 
Airplane 
Aeroplane 
Pushback 
Pullback 
Powerback 
Accident 
Engineer 
Ground 
Injury 
Fatality 
Tugs 
Towmotors 
Tarmac 
Parking 
Apron 
Hardstand 
In Searches: 
. 
.. 
Page 1 
VARIABLES AND THEIR OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
VARIABLE 
Type of Aircraft 
Number of Despatchers 
Despatcher's location 
Communications System 
Training 
\ ' 
Staff rest 
Language barrier 
Pushback tractor type 
Eguipment maintenance 
Ambient conditions 
to 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION 
Wide body (ie B747, A300, B767, DC10, 
L1011, A310, B757*) 
or 
Narrow body (ie B737, B727, DC9, MD80 
F28, A320, BAel46) ' -
Number of persons reguired to walk 
beside the aircraft fuselage during 
the pushback (ie 1, 2, or 3) 
The location of the Despatcher in 
relation to the aircraft and tractor ' 
during pushback. 
The type of cockpit to Despatcher 
communications methods being 
used (hand signals only, headset and 
lead, or cordless headset) 
Structured training systems 
in place to ensure that pilots, 
Despatchers, and tractor Drivers were 
all aware of the same applicability 
of procedures. 
Freguency of recurrent training. 
Extent of hazard awareness training 
Types of media used (ie posters, videos 
notice board notices). 
Limitations on the length of continuous 
duty before rests be taken. 
Number of days between days off 
Extent of communications difficulties 
between pilots and Despatchers due to 
language. 
Tractors that reguire towbars 
Towbarless pushback vehicles 
Routine maintenance programs exist 
covering vehicle safety related systems 
(ie lights, brakes, steering, tyres) 
Pushback operations occur in all 
weather conditions, windy or calm, hot 
or cold, wet or dry. 
APPENDIX NO. 5 
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Aircraft/tractor 
movement 
Influence of other 
operational pressures 
Pushbacks "are in a straight line, swing 
aircraft tail left, aircraft tail 
right, or a combination of these. 
To accomplish turns the tractor and 
aircraft may swing in opposite 
directions, due to the pivot point 
each end of the towbar 
Despatchers may hurry to achieve 
scheduled departure, or to hasten the 
release of staff involved to their next 
duty. 
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APPEMDIX6 
AUSTRALASIAN AIRLINE 
FLIGHT SAFETY COUNCIL 
December 24, 1992 •'•'"... 
Michelle Dupont 
Flight Safety Officer 
Air France 
1 Square. Max Hymans 
•F-75757 
Paris Cedex 15 France 
Dear Mr Dupont, , 
The Victorian Institute, of Occupational Safety and Health, in 
association with the Australasian Airline Ground Safety Council 
and Australasian Airline Flight Safety Council/ is conducting. 
research, via a Master of Applied Science (Occupational Health 
and Safety) program, into the causes and prevention of runover 
accidents to despatchers, during aircraft pushback. and despatch. 
Our research has revealed that at least 34 accidents have 
occurred worldwide.in which the person in communication with the 
flight crew via the headset and lead has been killed or seriously 
injured. All were run over by the pushback tractor or the 
aircraft nosewheel. The causes and prevention of these accidents 
are the specific- area -of study. 
With the help of the Airlines involved, we plan to obtain as much 
detail as possible concerning these, pushback accidents, so that 
we may compare the causation sequences and, hopefully, identify 
common causal factors. It is. then planned to deduce a range of 
preventive strategies which would then be suitable for adoption ' 
by all airlines. 
We understand that during 1982 Air France experienced a pushback 
accident resulting in serious injury to a despatcher at • -
Casablanca. \\ • 
To assist with our data collection and to ensure we. consider all 
possible aspects of the problem.area, we would appreciate if you 
could make the details of that accident available to us.. 
Ideally, we would be grateful if a copy of the detailed . 
investigation report could be made available. 
We understand the possible sensitivity of such information, and 
you may be assured that any details or reports you supply will be 
treated in strictest confidence. Further, as we have no interest 
in identifying any particular airline's data, we would be happy" 
if any information provided was completely de-identified and/or 
anonymous. • > • . . 
Of course, those airlines that participate in this study will be 
provided with a copy of our final report for their own. use. 
I trust you will find this proactive aviation safety initiative 
worthwhile and I look' forward to hearing from you in the near 
future 
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RECIPIENTS OF LETTERS REQUESTING ACCIDENT INFORMATION 
Capt Robert Costello 
Chief Pilot 
America West 
4000E Sky Harbor Blvd 
Phoenix AZ 85034 USA 
Mr Flavius Brown 
Senior Manager, Safety & Health 
Federal Express Corporation 
2900 Business Park 
Memphis TN 38118 USA 
Mr Ivar Busk 
Airside Safety Co-ordinator 
Department CPHGP 
Scandinavian Airlines System 
PO Box 150 
2770 Kastrup, Denmark , 
Mr John DeWitt 
VP-Flight Operations 
World Airways Inc 
Suite 400 
13873 Park Centre Road 
Hemdon VA 22071 USA 
Mr Bill Douglass 
Manager Loss Control and Corporate Safety 
Southwest Airlines 
PO Box 36611 
Dallas XT 75235-1611 USA 
Michelle Dupont 
Flight Safety Officer 
Air France 
1 Sguare Max Hymans 
F-75757 
Paris Cedex 15 
France 
Mr Donato Eramo 
Safety & Industrial Hygiene Manager 
Alitalia 
00050 Fiumicino 
Leonardo da Vina Airport 
Rome Italy 
Mr Trevor French 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
Causes and Prevention 
APPENDIX NO. 7 
Page 2 
Engineering Manager 
Ansett New Zealand 
PO Box 14-139 
Christchurch Airport 
New Zealand 
Mr David Hesterlee 
Manager Safety & Environment Compliance 
Delta Airlines Inc. 
TOC-1 D549 
Atlanta International Airport 
Atlanta GA 30320 
Mr Ron Horn 
Route 5 Box 582 
Maultrie Georgia 31768 USA 
Captain Jack Mitchell 
Director of Safety 
Air Canada 
909-200 Hall 
Nuns Island PQ Canada H3E1P3 
Dr John Montgomery PhD 
Manager Environmental, Safety & Health Programs 
American Airlines 
PO Box 619616 
Mail Drop 5425 
Dallas/Ft Worth Airport TX 75261-9616 USA 
Mr Robert Obadia 
President 
Nationair 
Route Cargo A-l 
Aeroport International de Montreal 
Mirabel PQ Canada J7N1A5 
Joy A Prescott 
Director Drug Abatement & Ground Safety 
Continental Airlines 
15333 JFK Boulevard 
Suite 420 
Houston TX 77032 USA 
Mr William R Simpson 
Regional Manager, Ground Saf 
US Air 
3800 North Liberty Street 
Winston Salam, NZ 27105 USA 
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Mr Koen van Ess 
Manager Safety Department 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 
PO Box 7700 (SPL/AS) 
1117 ZL Schiphol Airport 
The Netherlands 
Dr Bill Wells, PhD 
Director, Ground Safety & Environmental Management 
United Airlines SFOSY 
San Francisco International Airport 
Newark NJ 07114 USA 
Mr Rainer Wittenbecher 
Safety Engineer 
Lufthansa German Airlines 
Klughafen HAM PX1 
2000 Hamburg Germany 
£8 
AIRCRAFT PUSHBACK ACCIDENTS WORLDWIDE 1968-1992: 
CAUSES AND PREVENTION 
PARTICIPANT INTERVIEW RECORD 
PARTICIPANT: FUNCTION: PHONE: 
AIRLINE/ORGANISATION: FAX: 
Questions 
Type of Aircraft 
No. in Fleet 
Number of despatchers 
Communications System 
Training. 
Hazard awareness 
Staff rest 
Language barrier 
Despatcher's location 
Pushback tractor type 
Elaboration 
Wide body (ie B747, A300, B767, DC10, 
L1011, A310, B757*) 
or 
Narrow body (ie B737, B727, DC9, HD80 
F28) 
How many persons- are required to walk 
beside the aircraft fuselage during 
the pushback (ie 1, 2, or 3) 
What cockpit to despatcher 
communications methods are being 
used (hand signals only, headset and 
lead, or cordless headset) 
Are there structured training systems 
in place to ensure that pilots, 
despatchers, and tractor drivers were 
all aware of the same applicability 
of procedures 
Is recurrent training was provided 
Is hazard awareness training conducted 
prior to the accident. If so, what 
media was used (ie posters, videos, 
noticeboard notices) and what frequency 
was the message reiterated. 
Are there maximum duty periods laid 
down? If so how long? 
No. of days between days off? 
Do all participants speak in their 
native language. If not, how well did 
they communicate in the language used 
Where is the despatcher required to be 
located in relation to the aircraft 
Tractor which connects to the aircraft 
via a towbar, or one which connects 
directly to the aircraft wheel assenfcly 
and no towbar is required. 
Response 
A •• 
. 
• -
* 
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LIST OF AIRLINE SAFETY PROFESSIONALS INTERVIEWED 
Andrzej Bartosiak 
Manager 
Ramp Services Department 
Polish Airlines 
39, 17 Stcznia Street 
00-906 Warsaw, Poland 
Mr Flavius Brown 
Senior Manager, Safety and Health 
Federal Express Corporation 
2900 Business Park 
Memphis TN 38118 USA 
Paul Buchmann 
Direcotr 
Industrial Safety 
TEB 
CH-8 058 Zurich-Airport 
Mr Ivar Busk 
Airside safety Co-ordinator 
Department CPHGP 
Scandinavian Airlines System 
PO Box 150 
2770 Kastrup, Denmark 
Sum Seng Chee 
Safety Officer (Ground/Industrial) 
Singapore Airlines 
3SF, SIA Training Centre 
720 Upper Changi Road East, 
Singapore 1648 
William E Douglass 
Manager 
Corporate Safety & Loss Control 
Southwest Airlines Co. 
Employee Benefits Department 
PO Box 36611 
Dallas Texas 75235-1611 
Trevor French 
Manager Engineering 
Ansett. New Zealand 
PO Box 14-139 
Christchurch Airport 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents.Worldwide 1964-1992: 
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Kevin W Frommelt 
Corporate Safety 
Improvement Specialist 
Ground Services 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. 
Department C1510 
5101 Northwest Drive 
St Paul MN 55111-3034 
Geoff Hayes 
Manager Ground Operations Safety 
Canadian Airlines International 
6001 Grant McConachie Way 
Vancouver International Airport 
British Columbia 
Canada V7B 1V1 
Norman Hogwood 
Senior Ground Safety Adviser 
Air New Zealand 
Private Bag 
Auckland 
New Zealand 
Ron Horn 
Route 5 Box 582 
Maultrie Georgia 31768 USA 
Michael J Kemmis 
Manager Corporate & Airport Safety 
Qantas Airways Limited 
Qantas Jet Base 
Mascot 2020 
Australia 
Harrie G Legdeur 
Occupational Safety Engineer 
Occupational Safety Department (SPL/AS) 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 
Health Safety & Environment /Medical Services 
PO Box 7700-1117 ZL Schiphol Airport 
The Netherlands 
Frank Lubos 
Executive Director General 
Ground Operations Facility 
TSA Czechoslovak Airlines 
Airport Ruzyne /160 08 Praha 6 
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Mike MacDonald 
Safety Services Investigator 
British Airways 
Unit 3 Hatton Cross 
S599 Heathrow Airport 
Hounslow - Middlesex TW62JA 
Mr Ollie Ojczyk 
Senior Safety Co-ordinator 
Ansett Australia 
Melbourne Airport 
Tullamarine 3045 Australia 
Dieter Pietsch 
Co-ordinator Industrial Safety 
Atlantic Region 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
Department 960 
Terminal Room 201-4103 
Flughafen 
D6000 Frankfurt/M-75 Germany 
Kanin Raktham 
Assistant inspector General 
Thai Airways International Limited 
89 Vibhavadi Rangsit Road 
Bangkok 10900 
Thailand 
Reinhard Schmid 
Safety Engineer 
Manager Occupational Safety 
Flight Operations - Flight Engineer B747 
Lufthansa German Airlines 
FRA PX7 
D-6000 Frankfurt/M.75-Airport 
Mr William R Simpson 
Regional Manager, Ground Safety 
US Air 
3800 North Liberty Street 
Winston Salam, NZ 27105 USA 
J De Smedt, 
Safety expert 
Safety Department (P.SH) 
Sabena Belgian World Airlines 
Brussels National Airport 
Building 1/186 
B-1930 Zaventem 
Belgium 
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James E Swartz, MS, CHCM 
Manager 
Health & Environment 
Northwest Airlines 
Department C1510 
5101 Northwest Drive 
St Paul MN 55111-3034 
C Michael Swire 
Division Safety Specialist 
Technical Services 
Continental Airlines Inc. 
15900 Morales Street 
Houston TX 77032 
David Win 
Airport Systems Manager 
5th Floor Spicer House 
148 Victoria St 
Christchurch Airport 
New Zealand 
Aircraft Pushback Accidents Worldwide 1964-1992: 
Causes and Prevention 
-APPENDIX NO. 10 
Page 1 
LIST OF DESPATCHERS INTERVIEWED 
Alby Baker 
Station Engineer 
Australian Airlines 
Cairns International Airport 
Cairns QLD Australia 
Carl Baun 
Air New Zealand Engineering 
Auckland International Airport 
New Zealand 
Frank Coglan 
Australian Airlines Engineering 
Adelaide International Airport 
Adelaide SA Australia 
Anthony Crabbe 
Qantas Engineering 
Cairns International Airport 
Cairns QLD Australia 
David Hope 
Qantas Engineering 
Cairns International Airport 
Cairns QLD Australia 
Barry King 
Air New Zealand Engineering 
Auckland international Airport 
New Zealand 
Lee Hock San 
Singapore Airlines Engineering 
Changi International Airport 
Republic of Singapore 
Ian Martin 
Australian Airlines Engineering 
Adelaide International Airport 
Adelaide SA Australia 
Alf Newman 
Qantas Engineering 
Cairns International Airport 
Cairns QLD Australia 
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Joe Robinson 
Technical Representative 
Qantas Airways Limited 
Bangkok International Airport 
Bangkok Thailand 
Bruce Saunders 
Qantas Engineering 
Cairns International Airport 
Cairns QLD Australia 
Somchat J 
British Airways Engineering 
Bangkok International Airport 
Bangkok Thailand 
Pasguale Tenniello 
British Airways Engineering 
Aeroporti di Roma 
Rome Italy 
Wayne Treweek 
Engineering Supervisor 
Ansett New Zealand 
PO Box 53116 
Auckland Airport 
Colin Woodcock 
Qantas Engineering 
Cairns International Airport 
Cairns QLD Australia 
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LIST OF PUSHBACK DRIVERS INTERVIEWED 
Ken Butler 
Ramp Training and Safety Co-ordinator 
Australian Airlines 
Brisbane Airport 
Australia 
Clive Daw 
Ramp Services Operator 
Australian Airlines 
Melbourne Airport 
Australia 
Luigi Dibagi 
Driver 
Aeroporti di Roma 
Rome Italy 
Ilari Germano 
Driver 
Aeroporti di Roma 
Rome Italy 
Angelo Melis 
Driver 
Aeroporti di Roma 
Rome Italy 
Barry Morris 
Ramp Training and Safety Co-ordinator 
Australian Airlines 
Brisbane Airport 
Australia 
Franko Picchiotto 
Driver 
Aeroporti di Roma 
Rome Italy 
Frank Ridolfo 
Ramp Training and Safety Co-ordinator 
Australian Airlines 
Brisbane Airport 
Australia 
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Salvatore Salamone 
Driver 
Aeroporti di Roma 
Rome Italy 
Robin Stirling -
Ramp Training and Safety Co-ordinator 
Australian Airlines 
Brisbane Airport 
Australia 
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LIST OF AIRCREW INTERVIEWED 
Captain Gary Cox 
Manager Flight Safety 
Qantas Airways -
Sydney (KS) Airport 
Mascot 2020 
Australia 
Captain Neville J Hay 
Flight Operations Manager (Technical) 
Air New Zealand Limited 
Private Bag 
Auckland New Zealand 
FEO Doug McKenzie 
Flight Engineer Manager 
Australian Airlines 
Melbourne Airport 
Tullamarine 3043 
Australia 
Captain Ron Raymond 
Flight Standards Manager 
Ansett New Zealand 
Christchurch International Airport 
Christchurch 
New Zealand 
Captain Alan Slater 
Standards Manager - A300 
Australian Airlines 
Melbourne Airport 
Tullamarine 3043 
Australia 
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LIST OF AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE MANUFACTURERS INTERVIEWED 
George K Dial 
Safety Manager 
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group 
PO BOX 3707, MS 6M-WL 
Seattle WA 98124-2207 
Pat Brennan 
Senior Service Representative 
Rolls Royce LTD 
Sydney (KS) Airport 
Mascot 2020 
Australia 
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' INTERVIEW LOCATIONS 
Australia - Adelaide 
Cairns 
Melbourne 
Sydney 
Israel - Tel Aviv 
Italy '-'..' Rome 
New Zealand - Auckland 
Republic of - Singapore 
Singapore 
Thailand - Bangkok 
United Kingdom - London 
USA - Minneapolis St Paul 
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DEMOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF INTERVIEWEES 
Airline Safety Professionals: 
Australia -
Belgium 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia -
England -
Germany 
Israel 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Poland 
Republic of 
Singapore 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
USA 
Despatchers: 
Australia 
Italy 
New Zealand 
Republic of 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Melbourne 
Sydney 
Brussels 
Toronto 
Prague 
London 
Frankfurt 
Tel Aviv 
Amsterdam 
Auckland 
Christchurch 
Warsaw 
Singapore 
Stockholm 
Zurich 
Bangkok 
Dallas 
Houston 
Memphis 
Miami 
Minneapolis 
Winston-Salem 
Adelaide 
Cairns 
Rome 
Auckland 
Singapore 
Bangkok 
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Aircrew: 
Australia - Melbourne 
Sydney 
New Zealand - Auckland 
Christchurch 
I 
Drivers: 
Australia - Adelaide 
Brisbane 
Melbourne 
I Sydney 
Italy - Rome 
Manufacturers: 
, Australia - Sydney 
USA - Seattle 
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MAN GHH TOWBARLESS TUG MANUFACTURER 
Erich Roth 
Managing Director 
MAN GHH Australia Pty Ltd 
18 Rodborough Rd 
Frenchs Forest 2086 
Australia 
